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INTRODUCTION
Although race and religion generally have been treated in very distinct lines of
constitutional jurisprudence, government actions with respect to them, in
particular toward racial and religious outsiders,' raise similar concerns. Recently,
these parallels have been acknowledged by the Supreme Court in Board of
Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet2 and have led to
suggestions by some commentators, such as Neil Gotanda, on how they could be
treated constitutionally alike.3 The similarities of race4 and religion' can be traced
1. In this Article I use the terms "minority" and "outsider group" interchangeably.
2. 512 U.S. 687, 728 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[G]overnment may not
segregate people on account of their race, [as] ... it may not segregate on the basis of
religion"); see Colloquium on Law, Religion, and Culture, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 1 (1995-
1996) (devoting entire issue to the religion analogue of racial segregation raised in Kiryas
Joel); Abner S. Greene, Kiryas Joel and Two Mistakes About Equality, 96 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 57-83 (1996) (arguing that in Kiryas Joel, the Supreme Court took an approach
to religious accommodation more in line with its stance on affirmative action); see also
Jesse H. Choper, Religion and Race Under the Constitution: Similarities and Differences,
79 CORNELL L. REV. 491 (1994).
3. See Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution Is Color-Blind", 44 STAN. L.
REV. 1, 64-68 (1991) (suggesting treatment of racial affirmative action along religious
accommodation lines); David E. Steinberg, Religious Exemption as Affirmative Action,
40 EMORY L.J. 77 (1991) (suggesting treatment of religious accommodation along racial
affirmative action lines).
4. In this Article I use the terms "race" and "skin color" to designate a cultural or
ethnic group. See, e.g., Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 197 (1922) (illustrating the
use of terms denoting skin color to designate cultural identity). In its strictly scientific
conception, race (and skin color) has had little more importance than other particular
physical characteristics, such as hair color or height. Thus it is not as a term designating
certain primary physiological phenotypes of humans but rather as a cultural and social
concept, and in its societal and legal consequences, that "race" has been important in
American society. In that respect, it has acquired a meaning entirely independent of its
scientific moorings. See Gotanda, supra note 3, at 28-34 & n. 116 (discussing Justice
White's description of race in Saint Francis College v. Al Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (1987)).
For a discussion of the social conceptions of race that have been significant in American
history, see id. at 36-40, 56-59. See also infra text accompanying notes 61-65.
5. Here, I consider the functional aspects of religion as a source of group identity and
social cohesion. There are of course important cognitive (explanations of mysterious
events), and emotional human need for order and assurance against forces beyond human
control-aspects of religion. See generally J. MILTON YINGER, RELIGION, SOCIETY AND
THE INDIVIDUAL 52-56 (1957). While I do not discuss these aspects separately, they are
part and parcel of the cultural value framework that religion contributes to. See infra note
50 and accompanying discussion. To the extent that religious beliefs are not closely
related to a person's sense of identity, belonging, or cultural framework, such beliefs are
much more like ordinary opinions or other beliefs that are also protected under the Free
Speech Clause. See infra notes 98-99 and accompanying text. In that sense, religious
beliefs that are held less deeply or are less central to an individual carry less of the special
importance that is oftentimes associated with religion. Of course, my intention in this
Article is not to engage in an inquiry into what is or is not part of a religion; rather, it is
to assess those qualities commonly associated with religion that make it so different from
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to the analogous roles that both play with respect to individuals and their standing
in our society.6 The passion, prejudice, and hatred that both have evoked arise out
of differences that cannot be rationally debated,7 oftentimes involving matters
such as beliefs, values, and experiences that simply exist without a logical basis
and without a common ground of reference.' In fact, racial discrimination
frequently cannot be readily distinguished from religious discrimination, and vice
versa.
9
It is not surprising, then, that even though constitutional jurisprudence does not
formally combine race and religion, such parallels exist. For instance, government
"may not segregate people on account of their race, [as] ... it may not segregate
on the basis of religion," nor may it use either as a basis for discriminating
against a person." Although the constitutional jurisprudence of both race and
religion has appealed to the moral imperative of equality in our society, that goal
has been elusive in the race context. The discrepancy can, in part, be traced to the
unique and severe hostility and prejudice that some racial minority groups, such
as African Americans or Native Americans, have encountered in the past. While
both racial and religious conflicts continue to exist in our society, racial divisions
have a noticeably greater effect on people's everyday lives than religious
divisions.' 2
other beliefs in their significance to individuals.
6. See MILTON M. GORDON, ASSIMILATION IN AMERICAN LIFE 1-7 (1964).
7. As a historical matter, religious discrimination during colonial and early
postrevolutionary times bore many of the same hallmarks as racial discrimination. See
discussion infra Part I.A; see also Choper, supra note 2, at 492 (pointing out that religion
and race have been "the object of public (and private) stereotyping, stigma, subordination,
and persecution in strikingly similar ways"); Robert A. Destro, "By What Right?": The
Sources and Limits of Federal Court and Congressional Jurisdiction Over Matters
"Touching Religion", 29 IND. L. REV. 1, 50-51 (1995).
8, The inability to debate such differences in a rational manner is characteristic of
such differences.
9. For instance, it may be difficult to determine whether discrimination and
stereotyping of Middle Eastern Muslims or anti-Semitism is based on racial or religious
prejudice. See infra notes 83-85 and accompanying text; discussion infra Part I.B.2.
10. Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 728
(1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
11. Compare Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982) (prohibiting segregation
on the basis of race or religion), with Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,
213-17 (1995). Of course, on the surface, race and religion appear to deal with entirely
different personal attributes-race has been connected to unchangeable, involuntary
personal characteristics such as skin color and genetics, whereas religion appears to
concern itself with voluntary choices of one's belief system. However, the voluntariness
distinction is of little use when one considers that many religious practitioners take their
faith not as a matter of choice but of command from their god and thus are as little a
master of their beliefs as they are of their race. In our society, race and religion occupy
places of similar importance because both greatly affect an individual's self-identity.
12. The salience of race can be experienced in everyday life; however, statistical
support also exists. For instance, pursuant to the Federal Bureau of Investigation's hate
crime statistics for the years 1992 to 1994, hate crimes motivated by race (including
"antiwhite" bias) and ethnicity/national origin constituted 70-72% of all reported hate
crimes, whereas religion-motivated hate crimes made up approximately 17-18% of such
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Undoubtedly, one important reason for the slow progress toward racial equality
has been the historic exclusion of racial minority groups from participation in the
shaping of government policies that have burdened them.' 3 In contrast, greater
tolerance of religious differences has led to the development of a rich
jurisprudence over the scope and place of religious rights, a jurisprudence that
has proven more inclusive of the views of religious minorities than the
jurisprudence of race. 4 Even though the Supreme Court's constitutional
jurisprudence has generally shown increased solicitude for governmental
accommodations of religious rights, the Court has viewed special governmental
help for minority racial groups with much less favor. 5 It is for this reason that an
reported crimes. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFO. SERVS. Div., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1994
HATE CRIMES STATISTICS 7 (1994); CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFO. SERvs. DIV., U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, 1993 HATE CRIMES STATISTICS (REVISED) 9 (1993); CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFO.
SERVS. DIV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1992 HATE CRIMES STATISTICS 9 (1992). However,
of religion-motivated bias crimes, the vast majority (over 85%) of all such incidents were
anti-Jewish. See id. If such anti-Jewish bias crimes are classified as ethnic bias crimes,
see infra Part I.B.2, the proportion of race/ethnicity/national-origin-motivated crimes
climbs to over 85%, and religion-motivated crime drops to about 2%. The remainder of
reported hate crimes consists of crimes motivated by sexual orientation (approximately
11%). See also Christopher L. Eisgruber, Madison's Wager: Religious Liberty in the
Constitutional Order, 89 Nw. U. L. REv. 347, 373 (1995) (discussing the dangers of
religious factions to republican politics); William R. Tamayo, When the "Coloreds" Are
Neither Black nor Citizens: The United States Civil Rights Movement and Global
Migration, 2 ASIAN L.J. 1, 12-25 (1995) (discussing discrimination between immigrants
and the "native" class and within immigrant groups); cf. Bob Jones Univ. v. United
States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (holding that a compelling interest in eradicating racial
discrimination trumps a religious university's free exercise claims); JOHN WILSON,
RELIGION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 319-21 (1978) (arguing that religious differences among
Protestants, Catholics, and Jews are declining).
Of course, that does not mean that religious discrimination is no longer a problem. See
U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION (1979) (discussing the lack
of attention given to religious discrimination issues). However, religious discrimination
now appears to have a heavier impact on racial minority groups. See, e.g., Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (invalidating city
ordinance which prohibited religious sacrifice as unduly burdensome and not narrowly
tailored to accomplish asserted government interest) In this respect, the lines of racial and
religious discrimination tend to blur, and their effects overlap.
13. In fact, the Supreme Court's race jurisprudence, much of it aimed at preventing
discrimination against racial minorities, has nevertheless been criticized as actually being
harmful to minorities. See, e.g., Gotanda, supra note 3 (arguing that a "color-blind"
Constitution, as espoused by the Supreme Court, perpetuates oppression of racial
minorities because it fails to recognize or incorporate their experiences); Alex M.
Johnson, Jr., Bid Whist, Tonk and United States v. Fordice: Why Integrationism Fails
African-Americans Again, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1401, 1414-22 (1993) (arguing that
integrationism as a means of combating racial prejudice does not serve the best interests
of African Americans).
14. See infra Part I.D.I.
15. See Timothy L. Hall, Religion, Equality and Difference, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 50-52
(1992). Compare Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987)
(permitting religious discrimination by the Mormon Church as a means of facilitating free
exercise), and Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (holding that a school district's
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analytical approach to race using religious rights principles can appear so
attractive to civil rights advocates.
My main thesis is that the dichotomy of biology and belief through which race
and religion is generally viewed is largely unjustified. Race and religion are
important in our society not because of their underpinnings in biology or pure
belief, but because of their cultural significance and social implications to the
individual. In that respect they are of similar importance because they play
equivalent roles in the formation of an individual's conception of the self, sense
of belonging, and value framework. As a result, they should be treated alike as a
constitutional matter. At another level, this analysis also implies that we should
not look at the desire of some minority groups to preserve their distinctiveness,
whether based on religious or ethnic characteristics, as threatening to the
majority.
In Part I, this Article reviews the functional importance of race and religion
with respect to exclusion and discrimination against minority groups, and the
similar significance of race and religion in representing aspects of a person's
cultural identity. Considered in this light, the protections of the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses, as they incorporate the protections of the First
Amendment Religion Clauses, can be viewed as protecting individuals with a
cultural identity different from that of the majority against exclusion and
discrimination.1
6
Part II attempts to reconcile the constitutional jurisprudence of race and
religion, utilizing religion jurisprudence as a primary model and reference point.
In particular, this Article first considers pervasive regulation of race and religion
in the segregation and nonentanglement context. It then discusses notions of
formal and substantive equality in the treatment of racial and religious minorities
by focusing on the availability of mandatory religious accommodations, the
impact of Washington v. Davis1 7 on substantive equality in the race context, and
policy of permitting children to leave school early in order to attend classes in religious
instruction elsewhere is constitutional), with Adarand, 515 U.S. 200 (subjecting federal
race-based affirmative action program to strict scrutiny), and City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (finding municipal race-based affirmative action
impermissible under equal protection clause).
In particular, Justice Scalia represents the starkest example of this dichotomy. Compare
Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 743 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that a segregated school
district drawn for the benefit of a religious minority group should be permissible as a
legislative accommodation), with Croson, 488 U.S. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring)
(rejecting affirmative action as a means of "compensating for social disadvantages,
whether... acquired by reason of prior discrimination or otherwise"). This is particularly
puzzling when one considers that "the justifications of race-based affirmative action are
[much] stronger" than any such policies for religious groups. Ira C. Lupu, Uncovering the
Village of Kiryas Joel, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 104, 114 (1996).
16. In this Article I will not address the free-expression-protective components of the
Religion Clauses or those aspects of the Equal Protection Clause dealing with
fundamental rights or economic relations. For a discussion of the equality principle in the
free speech context, see Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First
Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 20 (1975).
17. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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the potential for "cultural" accommodations. Finally, this Article also reviews
affirmative action and legislative religious accommodations, and considers the
general criticisms directed at affirmative action, the notion of affirmative action
as a form of integration, and the religion equivalents to affirmative action.
I. SIMILARITY OF RACE AND RELIGION:
A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH
A. Religious Discrimination and Race Discrimination
Both religious and racial affiliation have been the basis for exclusion and
discrimination throughout the history of this nation, though religious differences
have been less a source of large-scale social conflicts in recent times. This is a
significant change from colonial and early postrevolutionary times. 8 While I do
not wish to engage in a detailed discussion of the history of both, a very brief
review clarifies an important parallel in the significance of racial and religious
differences.
In the early seventeenth century, religious establishments in the American
colonies 9 resulted in restrictions on dissenters' civil rights, including their right
to vote, and suppression and persecution of differing religious beliefs. The
colonies also enacted laws compelling church attendance, imposed religious oath
tests for office, and punished blasphemy.20 Virginia, the Carolinas, Maryland, and
Georgia required everyone to provide tax support to the Church of England.2
18. See, e.g., Zorach, 343 U.S. at 318-19 (Black, J., dissenting); Arlin M. Adams &
Charles J. Emmerich, A Heritage of Religious Liberty, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1559, 1562-82
(1989); Destro, supra note 7, at 50-51.
19. See generally SYDNEY E. AHLSTROM, A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
PEOPLE 121-384 (1972). The Church of England was established as the official church
in the Virginia settlement in 1611 and in Maryland and the Carolinas in 1702 and 1704,
respectively. See id. at 185-94, 197; DAVID CHIDESTER, PATTERNS OF POWER 18-19; see
also Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 9-11 (1946); A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
RELIGION IN AMERICA 97 (Edwin S. Gaustad ed., 1982) [hereinafter A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY]. Massachusetts and Connecticut established Puritanism. See THOMAS J. CURRY,
THE FIRST FREEDOMS 106 (1986); JOHN F. WILSON & DONALD L. DRAKEMAN, CHURCH
AND STATE IN AMERICAN HISTORY at xv (2d ed. 1987).
New York followed a "multiple establishment" system which gave it the power to
establish a church, and thus to force even dissenters to financially support one chosen
minister, in individual townships. See CURRY, supra, at 71-72. Rhode Island was the
exception, being "the first commonwealth in modem history to make religious liberty (not
simply a degree of toleration) a cardinal principle of its corporate existence and to
maintain the separation of church and state on these grounds." AHLSTROM, supra, at 182.
20. See, e.g., Adams & Emmerich, supra note 18, at 1562-82.
21. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 9-11; A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 19, at 97;
AHLSTROM, supra note 19, at 185-94, 197; CHIDESTER, supra note 19, at 18-19; CURRY,
supra note 19, at 105.
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Massachusetts expelled religious dissenters, banishing and executing defiant
Quakers.22
In this context, Catholics were among the most discriminated-against
Christians.23 And even though toleration among the various Protestant
denominations increased during the eighteenth century,24 Catholics and Jews, as
well as other religious minorities, remained the subject of officially sanctioned
discrimination, even following the revolution and during the Continental
Congresses. 2'
The adoption of the First Amendment did not put an end to government-
sponsored religion. The First Amendment imposed restrictions only on the federal
government,26 and barred it from interfering with or being involved in religious
communities, 27 including those supported by the states.28 Only after Cantwell v.
22. See CHIDESTER, supra note 19, at 21; see also CURRY, supra note 19, at 6-28;
Hall, supra note 15, at 29-30. The Massachusetts Puritans demanded religious conformity
because religious pluralism was equated with anarchy. See CURRY, supra note 19, at 6.
The Massachusetts Bay Company also restricted the voting franchise to members of the
Puritan Church in 1631. See AHLSTROM, supra note 19, at 147; WILSON & DRAKEMAN,
supra note 19, at xxi.
23. See A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 19, at 96-97; AHLSTROM, supra note
19, at 331-35; see also CURRY, supra note 19, at 31-53, 56, 72-73.
24. In 1691, Massachusetts provided liberty of conscience to all Christians, except
Roman Catholics. See WILSON & DRAKEMAN, supra note 19, at xxi. New York provided
for complete religious freedom in 1777. See id. Virginia passed Thomas Jefferson's Act
for Establishing Religious Freedom in 1786. See CURRY, supra note 19, at 135-46; see
also THOMAS JEFFERSON, A BILL FOR ESTABLISHING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1777),
reprinted in WILLIAM LEE MILLER, THE FIRST LIBERTY app. I (1986) (Virginia Act for
Establishing Religious Freedom (1786), introduced by Thomas Jefferson)
25. See CURRY, supra note 19, at 80, 91, 131-32. (Even in the early eighteenth
century, Catholics could be challenged to subscribe to a test or an oath of abjuration to
the pope, resulting in their exclusion from public life. Likewise, Jews possessed few civil
rights, and even those were subject to challenge. Thus, as late as 1784, Virginia permitted
only Christian ministers with a settled congregation to perform marriage ceremonies, and
fined people for working on Sundays. See id. at 148. Massachusetts protected rights of
worship only for Christian denominations, and authorized the legislature to require
attendance at religious instruction. See Adams & Emmerich, supra note 18, at 1571.
South Carolina restricted elective office to Protestants and dictated certain doctrines to
churches that wanted to be incorporated by the state. See CURRY, supra note 19, at 150;
Adams & Emmerich, supra note 18, at 1571. However, South Carolina changed those
constitutional provisions in 1790, see id., and in fact in 1791 incorporated a Jewish
congregation in Charleston, see CURRY, supra note 19, at 151. Maryland, though,
continued to require religious oaths and maintained a general anti-Catholic and anti-
Jewish atmosphere. See id. at 157-58.
While most historical accounts of this time period generally do not describe in any
detail the treatment of non-Christians, they presumably were equally subject to such
discriminatory treatment.
26. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 49 (1985); Permoli v. Municipality No. I of
New Orleans, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589, 609 (1845); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1161 n.25 (1988).
27. But that did not prevent the federal government from discriminating against some
religious groups, such as Mormons. See, e.g., Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 49-50 (1890) (repealing charter of
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Connecticut9 and Everson v. Board of Education ° were the First Amendment's
free-exercise guarantee and establishment prohibition also made applicable to the
states through Fourteenth Amendment incorporation.
Thus, the discrimination that religious minorities faced during colonial times
is in many respects similar to the system of oppression and discrimination that has
been visited on racial minorities.3 I will not discuss our nation's history of racial
discrimination here, in particular discrimination against African Americans,
Native Americans, Mexican Americans, or Asian Americans, since it has been the
subject of a multitude of works.32 Suffice it to say that even following
emancipation from slavery, African Americans were systematically prevented
from taking advantage of civil rights such as voting and jury duty, and, through
segregation and Jim Crow laws, otherwise kept from full participation in the
economic and social life of the larger society. Similar deprivations of civil rights,
though on a lesser scale, also applied to Mexican Americans and Asian
Americans,33 while Native Americans were pressured into assimilation, left
oftentimes without the civil rights enjoyed by others, and deprived of ancestral
Mormon Church because its precepts of polygamy were repugnant to enlightened people);
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164-66 (1878) (holding Mormon practice of
polygamy not protected by First Amendment).
28. As a result, many states continued the practice of supporting a particular church
or a system of multiple establishments, as well as the practice of imposing various other
religious tests and restrictions. See generally CURRY, supra note 19, at 193-222.
29. 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (applying the guarantee of the Free Exercise Clause to states
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
30. 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (applying the Establishment Clause to states through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
31. Of course, religious minorities, including Jews, Catholics, Mormons, and Quakers
continued to be victims of discrimination after the American revolution. See, e.g., R.
LAURENCE MOORE, RELIGIOUS OUTSIDERS AND THE MAKING OF AMERICANS 25-105
(1986); Alan E. Brownstein, Harmonizing the Heavenly and Earthly Spheres: The
Fragmentation and Synthesis of Religion, Equality, and Speech in the Constitution, 51
OHIO ST. L.J. 89 (1990).
32. See, e.g., WINTHROP JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK (1968); RICHARD KLUGER,
SIMPLE JUSTICE (1976); RONALD TAKAKI, STRANGERS FROM DIFFERENT SHORES (1989).
33. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural
Identity, 64 N.C. L. REv. 303, 321-23 (1986). For instance, until World War II, the right
of Asians to become naturalized U.S. citizens was severely curtailed or abolished by
Congress. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, The Civil Rights Revolution Comes to Immigration
Law: A New Look at the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, 75 N.C. L. REV. 273,
280-82 (1996). Asians and Mexican Americans were subjected to segregation, see
Westminster Sch. Dist. v. Mendez, 161 F.2d 774, 780 (9th Cir. 1947), and Asians were
prohibited from owning land, see Karst, supra, at 322. In California, Asians were even
prohibited from testifying in court against "whites," see People v. Hall, 4 Cal. 399 (1854);
see also Charles J. McClain, The Chinese Struggle for Civil Rights in Nineteenth Century
America: The First Phase, 1850-1870, 72 CAL. L. REV. 529, 548-53 (1984), and were
subjected to discriminatory taxes, see id. at 539-48, 553-59. Japanese Americans were
forced into internment camps during World War II. See Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214, 216 (1944); see also TRIBE, supra note 26, at 1466-74.
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lands through government policies that imposed great suffering and caused the
deaths of many.34
B. Race and Religion as Aspects of Cultural Identity
Beyond the similar experiences of discrimination and exclusion that racial and
religious minorities have faced, there are broader structural similarities in the
roles that race and religion have played in our society. Both are indicative of an
individual's self-identity and sense of belonging to a particular cultural
community.
One note about terminology before I move on. The way I use the term "cultural
group" in this Article largely overlaps with the description of ethnic groups in
that it denotes a group of persons who to a large extent share similar customs,
lifestyles, value orientations, religious beliefs, sense of historical continuity,
physical characteristics, and/or language." While the term ethnicity encompasses
attributes of religious beliefs and is not inherently linked to notions of biology,36
the term "cultural identity" avoids confusion with the more common notion of
ethnicity as primarily describing group affiliations based on race and ancestry. It
thus better captures the diversity of relevant factors and provides analytical
clarity by avoiding the primary association with race and national origin. 7
1. The Value of Cultural Identity and Group Membership
Cultural group membership and identity serve two important functions for
individuals. According to Will Kymlicka and Kenneth Karst, they provide means
by which an individual can achieve "belonging" and self-identification, and they
34. For a brief history of federal policy toward Native American tribes, see FELIX S.
COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 47-206 (Rennard Strickland et al. eds.,
1982). See also VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN
JUSTICE 1-21 (1983); TRIBE, supra note 26, at 1466-74.
35. See, e.g., CYNTHIA H. ENLOE, ETHNIC CONFLICT AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 15-
20 (1973); George A. De Vos, Ethnic Pluralism: Conflict and Accommodation, in ETHNIC
IDENTITY 15, 18-23 (Lola Romanucci-Ross & George A. De Vos eds., 3d ed. 1995);
GORDON, supra note 6, at 27-28 (discussing importance of race, religion, and national
origin in forming ethnic groups); AUDREY SMEDLEY, RACE IN NORTH AMERICA 29 (1993);
see also Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 740
(1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing cultural aspects of religious sect membership);
Greene, supra note 2, at 73 n.293.
36. See GORDON, supra note 6, at 27-28. Even though ethnic labels may be associated
with Bosnian Muslims, Croat Catholics, and Serb Orthodox Christians, groups that are
primarily distinguished by religion, ethnicity is not commonly used to describe the
religious differences that existed between Puritans, Quakers, and Catholics during
colonial times.
37. See, e.g., WILL KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY & CULTURE (1989); Karst,
supra note 33.
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form the basic scaffold of values and perspectives by which one evaluates and
gives meaning to experiences and actions.3"
Religion, race, and ethnicity are types of cultural groupings and consequently
are important sources of self-definition; they serve as reference points of identity
for an individual and others.39 Cultural group membership ("Where do I
belong?"), including ties to family, religion, and an ethnic group, is a
precondition to discovery and definition of one's self ("Who am IT).4 In this
respect, a sense of belonging to and identification with a community provides
assurance and confidence engendered by group solidarity.4 It is in their own
minds that individuals who share common experiences, values, or perspectives
feel bound together. A person identifying himself or herself as African American
38. See KYMLICKA, supra note 37, at 162-81; Karst, supra note 33, at 306-09; see also
J. MILTON YINGER, SOCIOLOGY LOOKS AT RELIGION 89-113 (1963) (discussing the social
forces involved in religious and ethnic group identification or withdrawal).
Will Kymlicka distinguishes his conception of the value of cultural group membership
from that of communitarians in that communitarians "deny that we can 'stand apart' from
(some of) our ends," believing instead that individuals are able to examine one's own
moral values and ways of life. WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP 91-93
(1995); see also KYMLICKA, supra note 37, at 47-70.
39. See Karst, supra note 33, at 306-09; see also Avishai Margalit & Joseph Raz,
National Self-Determination, 87 J. PHIL. 439, 449 (1990).
40. See Karst, supra note 33, at 308.
41. See KYMLICKA, supra note 37, at 175 ("Cultural heritage, the sense of belonging
to a cultural structure and history, is often cited as the source of emotional security and
personal strength."); see also Randall L. Kennedy, McClesky v. Kemp: Race, Capital
Punishment, and the Supreme Court, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1388, 1395 (1988) (discussing
the "propensity for persons to empathize more fully with those with whom they can
identify"). Various members of the Supreme Court have recognized the value of
belonging, particularly in the religion context. Thus,
the Establishment Clause is infringed when the government makes adherence
to religion relevant to a person's standing in the political community. Direct
government action endorsing religion or a particular religious practice is
invalid under this approach because it "sends a message to nonadherents that
they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members
of the political community."
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)); cf City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc.,
473 U.S. 432, 461 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that excluding the mentally
retarded "deprives [them] of much of what makes for human freedom and fulfillment-the
ability to form bonds and take part in the life of a community"); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 709
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("to be... excluded on religious grounds by one's elected
government is an insult and an injury that [cannot] be countenanced by the Establishment
Clause").
The need for such attachments has variously been attributed to sociobiological causes
(as a search for kinship), and to alienation from a large, heterogeneous, rapidly changing
society, and has been viewed as a utilitarian means in the struggle for power, status, and
income. See generally JEFF SPINNER, THE BOUNDARIES OF CITIZENSHIP 59 (1994) ("Ethnic
identity may be a way for some to make a large, anonymous world a little more
intimate."); J. MILTON YINGER, ETHNICITY 43-48 (1994).
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or Catholic or Jewish is not merely identifying those characteristics, but making
a statement about membership in and belonging to that particular cultural group.42
Cultural group membership also provides a person with a system of values,
customs, and ways of thinking that give one's life, activities, and choices meaning
and significance.43 These values serve as reference points for how we evaluate
and judge our own and others' experiences and activities.' "From the moment of
[one's] birth the customs into which [one] is born shape [one's] experience and
behavior,"45 and our cultural group accordingly shapes us as persons in ways that
we simply cannot disassociate from.46 It provides "the spectacles through which
we identify experiences as valuable" and through which we can meaningfully
experience and choose among options about how to plan and live our lives.47
Culture is thus the basic scaffold, the foundation, on which we build our lives and
judge our experiences and goals.
2. Religion and Race as Similar Cultural Groupings
It is with respect to the identity and cultural framework function that religion,
race, and ethnicity are different from other individual characteristics. Religious
beliefs and affiliation delineate communities," symbolize the common identity
of community members49 and provide a cultural value framework for those
42. See Kenneth L. Karst, Myths of Identity: Individual and Group Portraits of Race
and Sexual Orientation, 43 UCLA L. REV. 263, 268 (1995). Karst also discusses the
notions of "passing" (for African Americans) and "outing" (with respect to gays and
lesbians) as related to the issue of belonging to a cultural group. See id.
43. See KYMLICKA, supra note 37, at 164-66.
44. See id.; KYMLICKA, supra note 38, at 82-93; see also RUTH BENEDICT, PATTERNS
OF CULTURE (1934).
No man ever looks at the world with pristine eyes. He sees it edited by a
definite set of customs and institutions and ways of thinking. Even in his
philosophical probings he cannot go behind these stereotypes; his very
concepts of the true and the false will still have reference to his particular
traditional customs.
Id. at 2; see RONALD M. DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 228 (1985); CLIFFORD
GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 6-7 (1973); Karst, supra note 33; Margalit
& Raz, supra note 39, at 448-49.
45. BENEDICT, supra note 44, at 3.
46. Cf. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 222 (1993) ("bonds of society and
culture, of history and social place of origin, begin so early to shape our life and are
normally so strong that the right of emigration... does not suffice to make accepting its
authority free [of coercion]").
47. KYMLICKA, supra note 38, at 83 (quoting DWORKIN, supra note 44, at 227-28).
48. See EMILE DURKHEIM, THE SOCIAL FOUNDATION OF RELIGION 432 (1965)
("[B]efore all, rites are means by which the social group reaffirms itself periodically...
. Men who feel themselves united, partially by bonds of blood, but still more by a
community of interest and tradition, assemble and become conscious of their moral
unity."); see also BETTY R. SCHARF, THE SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF RELIGION 73-92
(1970).
49. See, e.g., CHIDESTER, supra note 19, at 83-86 (describing the relationship of
religion to community formation and maintenance as culture religion); THOMAS F. O'DEA
& JANET O'DEA AVIAD, THE SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION 14-15 (2d ed. 1983); SCHARF, supra
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members."0 The result is that the importance of religious beliefs usually reaches
far beyond the content of their tenets and distinguishes them from most
nonreligious opinions and beliefs.
That is demonstrated for instance in the strong congruence of community and
religious beliefs in faiths such as Judaism,"' Sikhism, Mormonism 2 or the Old
Order Amish.53 In such religious groups, community life oftentimes centers
around particular church or religious sect membership. 4 Based on the strength of
such religious beliefs and the effects on an individual's cultural value framework
note 48, at 40-47 (analyzing the overlap of religion and various societal memberships);
Stephen'Pepper, Conflicting Paradigms of Religious Freedom: Liberty Versus Equality,
1993 BYU L. REV. 7, 39, 41-42; see also Note, Reinterpreting the Religion Clauses:
Constitutional Construction and Conceptions of the Self, 97 HARv. L. REV. 1468, 1474,
1477-78 (1984) ("Defined functionally, a religion is a system of belief that is essential
to the self-definition of the believer.").
50. See GEERTZ, supra note 44, at 87-125 (describing religion as a cultural system of
symbols and meaning that provides the individual with a conception of the world and a
"gloss upon the mundane world of social relationships and psychological events," which
renders them thus "graspable"); cf CHIDESTER, supra note 19, at 31-33 (describing
Puritan theocratic model of government where "church and state were seen as two aspects
of a single order").
It is based on the value-generating quality of religion that conservative Christians have
sought and justified greater influence of Christianity in the schools and other aspects of
public life.
51. See Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994)
(involving self-isolation from the rest of society of a community of orthodox Jews); SCHARF,
supra note 48, at 42-44; YINGER, supra note 41, at 288 (discussing racial heterogeneity of Jews
in Israel but overarching commonality of religion); Gustav Niebuhr, Short Course in Judaism,
Especially for New Year, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 13, 1996, at B6 (discussing judaism in context of
community and identity).
52. See SCHARF, supra note 48, at 43-44.
53. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 216 (1972) ("for the Old Order Amish, religion
pervades and determines virtually their entire way of life, regulating it with the detail of the
Talmudic diet through the strictly enforced rules of the church community").
The unifying function of religious beliefs was especially important during colonial times.
At the time of the American revolution, "[a]fter a century and a half of colonial settlement in
which the overwhelming majority of citizens were Protestant, a contemporary would in many
instances have been hard put to define where [the religion of] Protestantism ended and secular
life began." CURRY, supra note 19, at 218. For instance, Calvinist theology and the associated
perspectives imbued everyday life to such a degree that on the basis of that shared morality
seventeenth-century Massachusetts Bay Colony Puritan magistrates were able to enforce
conformity to established Puritan religious doctrines without the help of Puritan ministers. See
id. at 7.
54. For instance, in studies conducted during the 1960s and 1970s, three-quarters of
American Catholics reported that their closest friends were Catholic. See ANDREW M.
GREELEY, RELIGION" A SECULAR THEORY 127 (1982); see also GORDON, supra note 6, at 122-
23 (discussing preference for marriage within the religious group). Furthermore, in marriages
that cross denominational lines, a frequent phenomenon today, a tendency exists for one of the
spouses to convert, usually to the denomination of the more devout partner. See id.
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and viewpoints, an individual may identify and define himself or herself foremost
as a member of the religion."5
In the race and ethnicity context, the cultural framework and identity functions
have caused the term "race" to acquire a significance and meaning well apart
from its scientific moorings as a concept describing genetic ancestry or particular
human physiological phenotypes.5 6 While segregation and slavery may in part
have been justified through pseudoscientific notions of racial superiority, as true
scientific concepts, race and its proxy skin color have had little or no relevance
in American society, as, for instance, the rule of "hypodescent 57 or shifting
judicial determinations of the meaning of "caucasian" and "white" have
demonstrated."8 Instead, race has been used in American jurisprudence as a
cultural and social concept, important because of its social implications in public
life and private interactions,59 because it is one of the most visible symbols of
55. Different religious communities hav6 different voting patterns and usually form social
reference groups for their members. See Robert P. Swierenga, Ethnoreligious Political
Behavior in the Mid-Nineteenth Century: Voting, Values, Cultures, in RELIGION AND
AMERICAN POLITICS 146 (Mark A. Noll ed., 1990). It has even been argued that in fact
"'theology rather than language, customs, or heritage was the foundation of cultural and
political subgroups in America."' Id. at 150 (quoting RICHARD J. JENSEN, THE WINNING OF THE
MIDWEST 89 (1971)).
56. Physiological characteristics and even diseases may be statistically correlated with
certain races and ethnic groups, such as sickle-cell anemia with African Americans or
Tay-Sachs disease with Eastern European Jews.
57. Under this rule, also called the "one-drop rule," a person with even one drop of
"black" blood, that is, regardless of the proportion of African ancestry, was considered
"black." For a discussion of the rule of"hypodescent," see Gotanda, supra note 3, at 23-
26.
58. The Supreme Court itself acknowledged that determinations of skin color under
the law is not a matter of biology but of sociological and political factors. Thus, testing
"whiteness" by
the mere color of the skin of each individual is impractical as that differs
greatly among persons of the same race, even among Anglo-Saxons, ranging
by imperceptible gradations from the fair blond to the swarthy brunette, the
latter being darker than many of the lighter hued persons of the brown or
yellow races. Hence to adopt the color test alone would result in a confused
overlapping of races and a gradual merging of one into the other, without any
practical line of separation.
Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 197 (1922). See generally IAN F. HANEY L6PEZ,
WHITE BY LAW 79-92 (1996) (discussing Supreme Court holding that Asian Indians, even
though caucasian, were not "white" for purposes of naturalization law, even though its
ruling issued only a few months earlier had defined "white" as "caucasian" in a
naturalization case involving a Japanese immigrant); Ian F. Haney L6pez, The Social
Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1994). This statement in itself can be seen as an attempt by
the Court to draw "race" lines based on characteristics other than biology.
59. See, e.g., STEVEN J. GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN (1981); Gotanda, supra
note 3, at 23-36; Karst, supra note 42, at 306-08; Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the
Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317,
330 (1987); L6pez, supra note 58; ef. Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604
(1987) (holding that private college's alleged discrimination against Arabs constituted
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cultural group membership and identity. ' Differing physical characteristics, like
differing religious or cultural practices, simply mark those who are different as
outsiders.6'
Because of their social importance, racial and ethnic groups have been
important in providing their members with a distinct sense of identity,62 as well
as a particular cultural frame of reference. The formation of ethnic enclaves, such
as Chinatowns or Little Italies in urban areas, or ethnic German communities in
Pennsylvania during colonial times, is testimony to that quality of racial and
ethnic identity. The influence of ethnic and racial group membership in shading
views and perspectives is readily apparent as well. Just as a conservative
Southern Baptist's view of American society and politics may be shaded by his
or her religion-based cultural background, so can the perspective of a Japanese
American be shaded by Japanese culture and World War II internment, and that
of an African American by our country's history of slavery, segregation, and
discrimination.63
Of course, religion is largely thought of as a changeable characteristic because
it is a form of belief. In contrast, race is generally viewed as unchangeable
because of its derivation from biology. But religious beliefs are in many ways just
as unchangeable as racial and other physical characteristics. Religious beliefs are
racial discrimination forbidden by 42 U.S.C. § 1981); Shaare Tefila Congregation v.
Cobb, 481 U.S. 615 (1987) (animus against Jews is the equivalent of racial animus for
purposes of the prohibitions of 42 U.S.C. § 1982).
60. In contrast, other immutable physical characteristics, such as eye color, height, or
shoe size lack the social symbolism of race. Given the social symbolism of race, it is not
surprising that the term "race" has been used interchangeably with "ethnicity." See Saint
Francis College, 481 U.S. at 611-13 (discussing post-Civil War congressional debates
that referred to various ethnic groups as separate races, including Scandinavians, Anglo-
Saxons, Germans, Jews, Latinos, Mexicans, Spaniards, Chinese, Mongolians, and
Gypsies).
61. Cf City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 472 (1985)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
The political powerlessness of a group and the immutability of its defining
trait are relevant insofar as they point to a social or cultural isolation that
gives the majority little reason to respect or be concerned with that group's
interests and needs. Statutes discriminating against the young have not been
common nor need be feared because those who do vote and legislate were
once themselves young, typically have children of their own, and certainly
interact regularly with minors. Their social integration means that minors,
unlike discrete and insular minorities, tend to be treated in legislative arenas
with full concern and respect, despite their formal and complete exclusion
from the electoral process.
Id. at 472 n.24 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
62. This perspective explains why it makes more sense to permit people to self-
identify with a racial group rather than to assign racial group membership based on skin
color. Only self-identification can capture the sense of belonging that is necessary to
ethnic identity.
63. See Johnson, supra note 13, at 1414-22 (opining that African American
community is a unique ethnic group); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., The New Voice of Color, 100
YALE L.J. 2007 (1991).
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usually instilled at an early age, transferred by family, and taught as part of a
person's value and belief system. Thought of by many religious practitioners as
an integral part of the adherents' self-identity, religious beliefs are accordingly
"something they did not choose, but which chose them." '64 Thus while racial
"differences" may be viewed as imposed by biology, so in the religion context,
differences can be equally outside of the voluntary control of the individual,
imposed by one's god." In that sense, religious affiliation can for social purposes
be just as immutable as racial affiliation.
In addition to its importance to individuals, the cultural identity function of
race and religion serves important roles in supporting a vibrant community and
society. Differing cultural frameworks can further goals of pluralism as embodied
in the Free Speech and the Free Association Clauses. Both religious and racial
minority groups can serve as incubators for views that are different and contribute
to the robust exchange of ideas in a democracy. 6 Cultural pluralism thus
contributes to the cultural diversity and richness of the mainstream culture 67 that
can strengthen our system of democracy.
But while religious and racial affiliation can contribute to the sense of
community, religious and racial identification and distinctiveness can also prove
divisive and lead to discrimination 8 and exclusion. 9 Indeed, such exclusion and
discrimination motivated Puritans and others to come to the American colonies
in the first place, and, in turn, led them to discriminate against dissenters and
nonmembers of their religion. In fact, formation or reinforcement of ethnic
groups, such as Asian Americans71 or African Americans72 can be traced in part
64. Hall, supra note 15, at 62; see also Brownstein, supra note 31, at 109-10; Michael
C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1176, 1215
(1996). The inclusion of religious affiliation as a suspect classification is consistent with
this view.
65. It is for this reason that forcing somebody to violate their religious beliefs inflicts
peculiar harms. See Hall, supra note 15, at 32-36.
66. See, e.g., KYMLICKA, supra note 38, at 84-93; Greene, supra note 2 (noting
importance of religion in forming nomic community); Timothy L. Hall, Religion and
Civic Virtue: A Justification of Free Exercise, 67 TUL. L. REv. 87 (1992).
67. See KYMLICKA, supra note 38, at 123.
68. See O'DEA & AVIAD, supra note 49, at 18 ("Moreover, by sacralizing the identity
it provides, [religious identification] may worsen and in fact embitter conflict, and build
deeply into the personality structures of people a recalcitrance to come to terms with an
opponent."); see also Hall, supra note 15, at 57-61. See generally Lawrence, supra note
59.
69. See, e.g., Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 382 (1985); see also
TRIBE, supra note 26, at 1163 n.38; Michael W. McConnell, Christ, Culture, and Courts:
A Niebuhrian Examination of First Amendment Jurisprudence, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 191,
194 (1992); cf. Perry Miller, Puritan State and Puritan Society, reprinted in WILSON &
DRAKEMAN, supra note 19, at 25-27 (discussing strong community basis of puritanism
and exclusion of those of a different religion).
70. See generally CURRY, supra note 19.
71. It has been suggested that the formation of an Asian American group identity has
been the result of the shared experience of discrimination. See Karst, supra note 42, at
297 & n.152. That is a significant observation since many immigrant Asians tend not to
view themselves as part of a larger Asian ethnic grouping but instead as part of
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to defensive efforts by those excluded and discriminated-against to recapture
some of the dignity and self-worth lost by discrimination.
In this respect, members of both religious and racial minorities have depended
on their groups to shelter them from the indignities imposed by the majority and
to fight discrimination and marginalization.73 Recognition of the peculiar
significance of religious groups to individual members has led to special
government deference to religious organizations and churches.74
However, exclusion and discrimination as factors contributing to ethnic group
distinctiveness are not much different from other factors, such as urbanization or
the necessity of local communal institutions and services, that create a desire for
individuals to belong to and obtain the support of a communal group.7" In that
respect, ethnic identity and culture arising out of experiences of exclusion are not
communities based on their national origin. In fact, until recent times, there arguably was
no such thing as an Asian American identity, only separate Japanese American, Korean
American, Filipino American, or Chinese American identities. Only recently has such an
identity emerged based on political organizing. See, e.g., Robert S. Chang, Toward an
Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical Race Theory, Post-Structuralism, and
Narrative Space, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1243 (1993); L. Ling-chi Wang, The Politics of Ethnic
Identity and Empowerment: The Asian-American Community Since the 1960s, ASIAN AM.
POL'Y REV., Spring 1993, at 43.
72. See, e.g., ENLOE, supra note 35, at 24-25; TRIBE, supra note 26, at 1518
(discussing subjugation of black Americans through slavery and segregation and the role
color played in institutionalizing that system); see also LAWRENCE W. LEVINE, BLACK
CULTURE AND BLACK CONSCIOUSNESS (1977); MOORE, supra note 31, at 173-200; cf
Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 148-55
(1976). See generally NATHAN GLAZER & DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, BEYOND THE MELTING
POT 52 (1963) (arguing that slavery, prejudice, discrimination, and associated factors
have created a communal group out of African Americans); JORDAN, supra note 32
(exploring attitudes of society toward African Americans and association of race with
social status as slaves).
Ronald Taylor has argued that black ethnicity is not purely the result of exclusion, but
has been and is also influenced by migration, urbanization, and intergroup conflict,
influences similar to those that promoted the development of ethnic identities and
communities among European immigrants. See Ronald L. Taylor, Black Ethnicity and the
Persistence of Ethnogenesis, 84 AM. J. Soc. 1401 (1979).
73. Cf NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1957).
74. See, e.g., Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976). Of
course, a particular religion may be practiced by a single person in a nonorganized
fashion and still be entitled to the protections of the Religion Clauses. See Frazee v.
Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989).
75. Other structural conditions that have been pointed to. as reasons for new
immigrants and even American-born individuals to join ethnic communities are de facto
residential segregation and occupational concentration in particular fields. See generally
Claude S. Fischer, Toward a Subcultural Theory of Urbanism, 80 AM. J. SOC. 1319,
1330-38 (1975) (arguing tmat urbanization is a cause of ethnic identity formation);
William L. Yancey et al., Emergent Ethnicity: A Review and Reformulation, 41 AM. Soc.
REV. 391 (1976).
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any less authentic or valuable than ethnic groupings that arise out of other
influences.76
These commonalities demonstrate not only that race and religion are similar,
but that discrimination on those bases is fundamentally the same in nature.
Discrimination based on religious or racial affiliation is simply a specific form
of discrimination against those who do not belong and who have a differing
cultural identity. Since certain religions have been associated closely with
particular ethnic/racial groups as a historical matter, it is not surprising that
religious-outsider status has frequently gone hand-in-hand with racial- and ethnic-
outsider status.' At one time, "national or ethnic origin was bound so closely to
... religious affiliation that Irish-Catholic, Swedish-Lutheran, or Russian-Jew
were descriptive of single identities to a great degree.""8 American slavery
provides the most palpable example of this close correlation. When African
slaves were initially brought to the American colonies, their enslavement was
justified by their religious beliefs: as heathens, they were not fully human and
simply not entitled to the rights of other Christians.79
C. Religion Clauses and Equal Protection Clauses as
Protection for Individual Cultural Identity
It is with this history of religious and racial discrimination and the cultural and
social significance of race8" and religion in mind that one must consider religion
76. For instance, African American culture has over time acquired many of the same
characteristics associated with other cultures, including distinctive arts and music, a
special holiday "Kwanzaa," see generally CEDRIC MCCLEsTER, KWANZAA (1990), by
some accounts even a unique English dialect, see YINGER, supra note 41, at 307-11
(discussing forms of and studies about African American vernacular English language),
and a distinctive form of Christianity, see id. at 265-68 (discussing recent studies of early
African American religions that characterize those religions as "distinctive form[s] of
Christianity"); see also MOORE, supra note 31, at 173-200.
77. With respect to ethnicity, significant, if not complete, overlap is to be expected
since ethnic groups oftentimes are defined or define themselves in large part along
religious lines.
78. YINGER, supra note 38, at 89-90. Suppositions about the overlap of religious and
ethnic/racial affiliation has in the past also led to (mis)labeling of particular racial groups.
For instance, Asian Indians were referred to generically as "Hindus" even though "only
a small fraction of the Asian-Indian immigrants were actually believers of Hinduism. One
third were Muslim, and the majority were Sikhs." TAKAKI, supra note 32, at 295.
79. See JORDAN, supra note 32, at 20-24, 40-43 (arguing that justification for slavery
arose out of the view that African Americans were heathens). Jordan notes that slavery
was also justified based on the alien cultural practices of African Americans. See also
Paul Finkelman, The Crime of Color, 67 TUL. L. REv. 2063, 2072-75 (1993) ("[I]n the
seventeenth century, when English settlers first adopted slavery, the very 'heathenism'
of Africans made them subject to slavery."); Gotanda, supra note 3, at 33.
80. From this point forward, I will use the term "race" in the discrimination context
to refer to both racial as well as ethnic and national origin/ancestral discrimination. The
Supreme Court has applied the same scrutiny to such discrimination. See Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 223-24 (1995); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S.
475, 479 (1954); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943). But see Juan F.
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and race jurisprudence. Concerns about the rights of religious and racial
minorities and outsider groups were of sufficient national magnitude in the
context of their times to prompt constitutional amendments.8' In both situations,
the history of discrimination against both types of minority groups had been well
known at the time of the adoption of the constitutional amendments.82
In the First Amendment context, concerns over federal interference with
religious practices were translated into prohibitions against federal establishment
of religion as well as a guarantee of religious free exercise.83 The focus on
religious liberty makes sense in light of the cultural divisions during colonial and
early postrevolutionary times-cultural group lines fell largely along religious
Perea, Ethnicity and the Constitution: Beyond the Black and White Binary Constitution,
36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 571 (1995) (arguing that ethnicity is not fully protected).
References to ethnicity will be made to refer to ancestral notions of cultural groups. I also
like to avoid the use of the term "black" and "white," unless called for in the particular
context or used by others, because they create a false dichotomy and are not very
descriptive of the cultural issues addressed here. But see Gotanda, supra note 3, at 4 n.12.
In that same sense, religion jurisprudence does not speak in terms of Christian versus
non-Christian religions.
81. Modem revisionist interpretations of the Religion Clauses have ascribed to the
framers of the Constitution only two principles: "to protect state religious establishments
from national displacement, and to prevent the national government from aiding some but
not all religions." TRIBE, supra note 26, at 1161. But see CURRY, supra note 19, at 207-
22. Whether that view or the traditional view, that the Religion Clauses were intended to
erect a wall of separation between church and state generally, see Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971); TRIBE, supra note 26, 1278-82; Jesse H. Choper, The
Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools, 56 CAL. L. REV. 260, 273 (1968),
is correct is of little importance to the analysis here.
82. See CURRY, supra note 19, at 222; WILSON & DRAKEMAN, supra note 19, at 76
(quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 731 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789)) (statement of Madison
expressing opinion that purpose of the Religion Clauses should be to prevent preeminence
of one or two sects and compulsion to conform to those sects); see also Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532 (1993) ("'historical
instances of religious persecution and intolerance ... gave concern to those who drafted
the Free Exercise Clause') (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 703 (1986) (omission
added). The adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment was, of course, the result of slavery
and the Civil War.
83. The individual need only show that the religious belief is sincerely held; inquiry
into its substantive truth is prohibited. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-87
(1944). The prohibition guards against impermissible restrictions on the free exercise of
religion, see TRIBE, supra note 26, at 1181-83, or impermissible establishment of
particular forms of religions. See Jesse H. Choper, Defining "Religion" in the First
Amendment, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 579, 579-80 ("Indeed, the very idea of a legal definition
of religion may be viewed as an 'establishment' of religion in violation of the first
amendment.") (citation omitted); Stanley Ingber, Religion or Ideology: A Needed
Clarification of the Religion Clauses, 41 STAN. L. REV. 233, 240 (1989). But see United
States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 166 (1965) (construing conscientious-objector exemption
of the selective service statute, which specifically only referred to religious objections,
to cover nontheistic and other belief systems that "occup[y] a place in the life of its
possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God").
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beliefs.84 Thus, as protective devices for religious minorities, the Religion
Clauses parallel the function of the Equal Protection Clause, as described in
footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products Co. 5
Of course, invidious discrimination and prejudice against others is not directed
at cultural outsiders alone. Feelings of superiority and hostility against others can
be caused by any number of rational and irrational reasons other than the other's
outsider status. And to some extent, those kinds of unreasonable and irrational
beliefs, as we may perceive them, are protected by the Constitution through the
Free Speech Clause and the Religion Clauses.86 The justification for providing
special protections to cultural minority groups arises out of the nature in which
cultural outsiders are different and out of their peculiar susceptibility to
prejudicial treatment and exclusion."'
The differing values and perspectives of members of a different cultural group
can make disagreements traceable to such differences difficult to resolve. Unlike
debates that are based on shared assumptions and values, such as by scientists
over the interpretation of the results of a particular experiment, debates that are
not based on such common starting points are almost nonsensical. Inherently, the
bases of cultural differences, such as the merit or truth of various religious
doctrines or the validity of the perceptions and experiences of different racial
groups, cannot themselves be the subject of logical and rational debate. Such
matters deal in issues of faith and a cultural community's basic values and
experiences. None of these can be objectively "wrong"-only different; nor can
84. Cf. Steven B. Epstein, Rethinking the Constitutionality of Ceremonial Deism, 96
COLUM. L. REv. 2083, 2099-101 (1996).
85. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
Nor need we inquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of statutes
directed at particular religious, or national, or racial minorities: whether prejudice
against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied
upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching
judicial inquiry.
Id. at 153 n.4 (citations omitted); see also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRUST
135-79 (1980). Both the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause, even though
distinct and separately set out, have been characterized as complements of each other in
providing for religious equality. See Hall, supra note 15, at 50 (suggesting that the Equal
Protection Clause and Religion Clauses converge in the suspectness of the use of either
religion or race for classification purposes).
For a critique of Carolene Products's conception of "discrete and insular minorities,"
see Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARv. L. REv. 713 (1985).
86. See, e.g., Capital Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753,
115 S. Ct. 2440, 2450 (1995) (holding Ku Klux Klan-erected cross on public property
protected by Free Speech Clause); see also Gotanda, supra note 3, at 10-12.
87. See, e.g., Robert M. Cover, The Origin of Judicial Activism in the Protection of
Minorities, 91 YALE L.J. 1287, 1296 (1982) ("'Discrete and insular' minorities are not
simply losers in the political arena, they are perpetual losers. Indeed, to say that they lose
in the majoritarian political process is seriously to distort the facts: they are scapegoats
in the real political struggles between other groups."); see also John Hart Ely, The
Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHi. L. REv. 723, 732-33
(1974).
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they be logically justified-they simply exist. Moreover, because our surrounding
culture begins to shape us in childhood, it may be very difficult to consider the
values, assumptions, and experiences of another cultural group in a manner
unbiased by one's own cultural assumptions and values."8 What is known about
members of the other group is often based on stereotype, myth, or ignorance. 9
The ignorance, myth, and stereotypes in turn create an image of the other group
that is alien and usually inferior. 90
Yet, while it may be conceded that religion and race are closely related in their
significance to individuals as a social, scientific, and philosophical matter, some
may be skeptical about the relevance of this to those individuals' treatment by the
law.9' In order to simplify that inquiry, I focus on the unique self-definition and
value-framework functions of religion that are protected by the First Amendment,
and as incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment. While the Religion Clauses
protect other aspects of religion as well, such as the expressive aspects,
(proselytizing or invoking religion in public debate), and associational aspects,
(churches and group worship), these protections are not unique to the Religion
Clauses; they are also protected by the Free Speech and Free Assembly Clauses,
respectively. 92 Therefore, the aspects of religion that would specifically suffer
harm from government actions if the Religion Clauses did not exist would be the
identity and value-framework aspects.93 Yet, these functions are also the functions
88. See DWORKIN, supra note 44, at 228; RAWLS, supra note 46, at 222.
89. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REV.
1060, 1071-72 (1991). It is also in this sense that African Americans may be "invisible"
to the rest of society-attempts at self-definition are ignored, and instead what is known
about African Americans is only what a "white"-dominated culture perceives of them. See
id. at 1069-70.
90. See, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 59, at 331-36.
91. Of course, social, scientific, and philosophical approaches to the law, such as law
and economics, have been used widely.
92. In fact, up until the 1960s, the primary vehicle for protecting religious freedom
was the Free Speech Clause. See, e.g., Capital Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette,
515 U.S. 753, ____, 115 S. Ct. 2440, 2446 (1995). The importance of protecting religious
beliefs under the Free Speech Clause is also recognized in the political discourse of our
nation. But see Ingber, supra note 83, at 244-45 (arguing that the scope of protection for
religion is more expansive than that for speech, assembly, and equal protection); John H.
Mansfield, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the Philosophy of the
Constitution, 72 CAL. L. REV. 847, 852-54 (1984).
Some commentators have argued that even the Free Speech Clause protects aspects of
personal identity. See, e.g., David Cole & William N. Eskridge, Jr., From Hand-Holding
to Sodomy: First Amendment Protection of Homosexual (Expressive) Conduct, 29 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 319, 330-35, 337-41 (1994).
93. This aspect of the Religion Clauses was most prominently implicated in Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), where application of the Free Speech Clause might not
have provided sufficient protections. See also discussion infra Part I.D.3. Religious
belief, in contrast to many other types of beliefs or opinions, by being the result of an
inner compulsion without an alternative, is thus constitutive of the self. See Dorf, supra
note 64, at 1215; Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Fourteenth Amendment's Constitution,
69 S. CAL. L. REV. 47, 92-94 (1995).
Another indication that it is the identity function of religion that is of great concern to
the Court has been the cases involving conscientious objectors to the draft. In those cases
[Vol. 73:119
] RACE, RELIGION, AND CULTURAL IDENTITY
of race that the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses protect with respect to
members of racial minority groups. They protect individuals against
discrimination on the basis of "who one is."94
Considering the Religion Clauses and the Fourteenth Amendment as means of
protecting the cultural identity of individuals and preventing discrimination
against outsiders is useful to the perennial question raised by Carolene Products:
What kind of minorities are "discrete and insular" such that they qualify for
special protections under the Fourteenth Amendment?95 Focusing directly on the
nature and some of the causes of prejudice provides one answer to that question:
cultural minorities. 6 It also suggests that an important purpose of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments is to protect and promote the cultural identity of
individuals-not simply to prohibit the governmental use of race or religion as
criteria for regulation or benefits eligibility.97 Finally, it also suggests that the
the Court found, after greatly contorting the statutory language, that the exemption
applied even though the individual seeking the exemption did not hold the statutorily
required religious belief, but did oppose war on deeply held grounds that were integral
to his conception of existence and thus his self-identity. See Welsh v. United States, 398
U.S. 333, 339-40, 342 (1970), in which a conscientious objector justified his refusal to
serve as, "I can only act according to what I am. . . ." See also United States v. Seeger,
380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965).
94. While a religious practitioner may technically be able to separate the overt
religious practices from himself or herself to avoid discrimination, free exercise prevents
the government from using the power of "punishment" based on an activity as an
alternative means to the power of "punishment" based on status (as a certain religious
adherent). But see Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164-66 (1878).
95. See Ely, supra note 87, at 729-30. The defeat of a group's interest in the political
process does not automatically make it a discrete and insular minority, just as remedial
legislation as an act of grace from the majority does not translate into equal political
participation. See id. at 729. It is therefore necessary to look beyond the mere loss of a
particular legislative battle to determine which groups are discrete and insular.
96. Defining relevant aspects of cultural identity, in addition to race, ethnicity, and
religion and the exact boundaries of that concept, is beyond the scope of this Article
though language and maybe cultural dress would probably be covered. See also infra
discussion accompanying notes 202-04. However, Avishai Margalit and Joseph Raz have
identified criteria of cultural distinctiveness in a related context-justifications for
political self-government rights-that are instructive here. See Margalit & Raz, supra
note 39, at 439. Some of the criteria that might be appropriate here are: (1) possession of
a shared common character or culture, (2) characteristics that permit mutual recognition,
(3) group membership that is integral to self-identity, and (4) membership that is a matter
of belonging and not of achievement. See also YINGER, supra note 41, at 3-5, 141-44
(discussing types of socially and psychologically significant ethnic groups as opposed to
administrative or classificatory groupings). Furthermore, the relationship between the
majority and minority groups, the "cultural distinctiveness" of the minority from the
majority, may be relevant as well. See Aviam Soifer, On Being Overly Discrete and
Insular: Involuntary Groups and the Anglo-American Judicial Tradition, 48 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 381, 408 (1991).
97. The Supreme Court's jurisprudence has continued to emphasize that the rights
protected under the Fourteenth Amendment are individual rights rather than rights of a
group. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226 (1995); Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
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constitutional protections afforded to members of racial and religious minorities
should be equivalent. The question that remains is whether this perspective is
supported by the jurisprudence of race and religion.
D. Race and Religion Under the Constitution
1. The Equality Principle
The notion of equality of all persons reaches as far back in our country's
history as the Declaration of Independence: "We hold these truths to be self-
evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator
with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the
Pursuit of Happiness."" And it is the principle of equality99 thathas thoroughly
permeated the jurisprudence of race and religion.0 0 Protection for religious
liberties under the First Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause has revolved around equality concerns.'' The Establishment Clause and
its due process analogue generally prohibit preferential treatment of or aid to one
religion over others, or religion in general over irreligion.' °2 The Free Exercise
U.S. 265, 289-94 (1978). Ascribing significance to an individual's membership in a
particular cultural group does not speak to the rights of the group, only to the rights of
the individual. In this sense, protections or benefits accruing to an individual are not
based solely on "membership in a particular group," Bakke, 438 U.S. at 299, but rather
on the specific harm suffered by the individual-due to and connected to membership in
a particular group. Considering cultural group membership as important to individuals
does not conflict in any way with the individual-centered focus of the Equal Protection
Clause. See David Chang, Discriminatory Impact, Affirmative Action, and Innocent
Victims: Judicial Conservatives or Conservative Justices?, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 790, 798-
99 (1991).
98. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis added).
99. In the religion context, the terminology for "equality" has frequently been couched
in that of "neutrality," though for the purposes here, the meaning is the same. See, e.g.,
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 559 (1993)
(Souter, J., concurring). See generally Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and
Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REv. 993 (1990). I will use the
term "equality" to refer to neutrality as used in the religion context.
100. See, e.g., CURRY, supra note 19, at 199; see also Church of the Lukumi, 508 U.S.
at 532; Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244-45 (1982); Hall, supra note 15, at 77-88
(discussing the influence of the equality principle in the religion context); Jane
Rutherford, Equality as the Primary Constitutional Value: The Case for Applying
Employment Discrimination Laws to Religion, 81 CORNELL L. REv. 1049 (1996).
In that sense, both establishment and free exercise form complementary notions of
religious equality, both providing guarantees against religious discrimination and thus
protecting religious liberty. See Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 256-59
(1962) (Brennan, J., concurring).
101. See, e.g., Hall, supra note 15; Michael A. Paulsen, Religion, Equality and the
Constitution: An Equal Protection Approach to Establishment Clause Adjudication, 61
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 311 (1986).
102. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52-53 (1984); Larson, 456 U.S. at 244;
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
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Clause prohibits discrimination through the imposition of obstacles to a particular
person's practice of his or her religion. °3 In fact, the Court has noted that equal
protection claims of invidious discrimination rooted in religious differences
overlap with establishment claims.'O° Similarly, equal protection analysis has
found its way into free exercise jurisprudence.' °
The desire to achieve religious equality has been so strong, in particular to
ensure that members of minority religions are truly equal to those of the majority,
that traditional "wall of separation" advocates like former Justice Brennan,
endorsement-approach supporters like Justice O'Connor, and conventional-
deference advocates like Justice Scalia, would all permit state actions that
provide special dispensations to minority religion followers from generally
applicable laws that otherwise would unduly impact those minorities.1
0 6
Equality has also been the guiding principle of race jurisprudence. 0 7 In this
respect, the purpose of the Equal Protection Clause was to "secure[] equality of
rights among all the citizens of the United States"'0 8 and to "make an equality in
103. See Church of the Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 532; Larson, 456 U.S. at 245 ("Madison's
vision.., naturally assumed that every denomination would be equally at liberty to
exercise and propagate its beliefs."); see also Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S.
574, 604 n.30 (1982) (noting it is well settled that neither state nor government may favor
one religion over another).
104. See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 449 n.14 (1971) (noting that the equal
protection claim is "not an independent argument in the context of these cases"). In Walz
v. Tax Commission of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring),
Justice Harlan stated that religious neutrality "in its application requires an equal
protection mode of analysis." See also Paulsen, supra note 101, at 315 (suggesting an
equal protection approach to Establishment Clause adjudication).
105. See Larson, 456 U.S. at 246-47; infra note 109. The extent to which the Supreme
Court's statements regarding religion as a suspect form of classification under the Equal
Protection Clause and those regarding religious discrimination as violative of due process
are distinct lines of reasoning (or are one and the same) is unclear. However, since the
Due Process Clause contains an equal protection component out of which protection
against invidious religious discrimination springs, there should be no distinction between
the analysis under either. Thus, it is irrelevant whether one proceeds under the Due
Process Clause or the Equal Protection Clause.
106. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963); Choper, supra note 2, at 504. But see Employment Div., Or. Dep't of Human
Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding the Free Exercise Clause permits the
State to prohibit sacramental peyote use).
107. The principle "equal protection of the laws" was "so clearly within the spirit of the
Declaration of Independence... that no member of this House [could] seriously object
to it." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2510 (1866) (statement of Rep. Miller),
reprinted in THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES 215 (Alfred Alvins ed.,
1967) [hereinafter RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS].
108. Id. at 2502 (statement of Rep. Raymond), reprinted in RECONSTRUCTION
AMENDMENTS, supra note 107, at 214; see also id. at 2539 (statement of Rep.
Farnsworth) (recognizing a general notion of equality arising out of the Equal Protection
Clause), reprinted in RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS, supra note 107, at 217.
1997]
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
every respect between the two races."'0 9 Debates about the constitutional
amendment on the House floor repeatedly indicated that the substance of the
Amendment only embodied that which was already present in the Declaration of
Independence, the reference that "all men are created equal.""' This legislative
history indicates that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not intend to
confine equal protection to equality of treatment but sought to achieve treatment
of each individual as an equal, the same principle that underlies religious
equality.
However, even though both the Religion Clauses and the Fourteenth
Amendment contain the same principle of equality,"' the Supreme Court has not
treated classifications by these two types of groups in the same manner. Inherent
in the principle of equality are the notions that (1) like cases should be treated
alike and (2) different cases should be treated differently." 2 But it is only in the
109. Id. at 2530 (statement of Rep. Randall) (stating "[t]he first section proposes to
make an equality in every respect between the two races," even though he opposed it),
reprinted in RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS, supra note 107, at 216; see also id. at 2961
(statement of Sen. Poland) ("[This amendment] is the very spirit and inspiration of our
system of government, the absolute foundation upon which it was established. It is
essentially declared in the Declaration of Independence and in all the provisions of the
Constitution."), reprinted in RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS, supra note 107, at 230; id.
at 2766 (statement of Sen. Howard) ("[This amendment] abolishes all class legislation in
the States and does away with the injustice of subjecting one caste of persons to a code
not applicable to another."), reprinted in RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS, supra note
107, at 220; id. at 2539 (statement of Rep. Farnsworth) ("I... hope that Congress and
the people of the several States may yet rise above a mean prejudice and do equal and
exact justice to all men, by putting in practice that 'self-evident truth' of the Declaration
of Independence."), reprinted in RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS, supra note 107, at 217.
110. See id. at 1034 (statement by Rep. Bingham, drafter of amendment) ("[E]very
word of the proposed amendment is to-day in the Constitution of our country."), reprinted
in RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS, supra note 107, at 150. Congressional debates over
the Freedmen's Bureau, which was designed to help only the former slaves during the
Reconstruction period and not all others in the former confederate southern states,
support that view. See also Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 397-98
(1978) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative
History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753, 784-88 (1985).
111. See, e.g., Hall, supra note 15; Kenneth L. Karst, Foreword: Equal Citizenship
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 42 (1977); Paulsen, supra note
101, at 315.
112. See Karst, supra note I 11, at 5 (discussing equality of citizenship as an underlying
principle of the Equal Protection Clause); cf Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442
(1971) ("Sometimes the grossest discrimination can lie in treating things that are different
as though they were exactly alike .... ) (construing Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23
(1968)); TRIBE, supra note 26, at 1438-39, 1514-16 (discussing equality in terms of
treating people as equals and subjecting them to identical treatment, and the prohibition
on subjugation of others); Pepper, supra note 49, at 50 (arguing that the Free Exercise
Clause can be viewed as a "guaranty of substantive rather than merely formal equality")
(emphasis in original).
From a different perspective, these two components of the equality principle constitute
the ideal of equality and its social reality that Richard Wasserstrom has analyzed in the
context of racism and sexism. See Richard A. Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism, and
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religion context that the Court has fully incorporated both notions and taken a
substantive approach to equality."' For instance, the Court has rejected a truly
religion-neutral Establishment Clause test whereby the government could not
utilize religion as a criterion for action or inaction. Instead, the Court has
specifically recognized that religion-neutral laws may affect different religions
in dramatically different ways."' In contrast, the Court has, with some
exceptions,"' largely ignored the tenet that different cases be treated differently
in the race context." 6 But whether one justified slavery of African Americans on
the basis of race or religion, "' or whether discrimination against the Santerian
religious practices of Cuban Yorubans"' was the result of their racial or religious
minority status is in the end irrelevant-both forms of discrimination are
invidious and based on prejudice arising from the alien nature of the group
discriminated against.
Of course, textualists might justifiably raise the point that different
constitutional treatment is arguably justified by the textually different language
of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Religion is specifically mentioned in the
First Amendment as a subject of constitutional protection. Since no such
corresponding reference to race exists in the Fourteenth Amendment, concerns
of race might arguably be considered of lesser constitutional importance. But the
First Amendment's textual language itself applies only to the federal government.
Protections against the states arise out of the First Amendment's incorporation
into the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause." 9 Thus, while religion
might be "singled out" as a special right under the First Amendment, it is not so
Preferential Treatment: An Approach to the Topics, 24 UCLA L. REv. 581 (1977).
113. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); see also Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 559-63 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring).
One commentator has argued that unlike religion jurisprudence, where the Court has been
"concerned with both aspects of the formal principle of equality.., that the similar be
treated similarly and the different be treated differently," in the equal protection context
the Court has been "oriented toward a difference-denying perspective," that everybody
should be treaty similarly. Hall, supra note 15, at 50-52.
114. See Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986); Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 398 (permitting
governmental consideration of religion as a means of accommodating free exercise);
Quaring v. Peterson, 728 F.2d 1121 (8th Cir. 1984), aff'dper curiam sub nom. Jensen v.
Quaring, 472 U.S. 478 (1985); see also TRIBE, supra note 26, at 1163. But see
Employment Div., Or. Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
115. Thus in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 486-88 n.1 (1954), the
defendant school board improved the segregated school's facility during the course of the
litigation so that by the time the case reached the Supreme Court, the physical facilities
were considered equal in their physical aspects. However, "separate but equal" in the
context of segregation could never satisfy the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause
in spite of the equality of available educational facilities because of the message and
badge of racial inferiority it imposed on African Americans. See id.; see also Karst, supra
note 33, at 323 (suggesting that "separate but equal" has a stigmatizing effect).
116. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 230-31 (1995) (prohibiting
differing benign treatment of minorities under the Equal Protection Clause).
117. See supra note 85 and accompanying text; supra Part I.B.2.
118. See Church of the Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 524-25.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 29-30.
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singled out under the Fourteenth Amendment. And with regard to the text of the
Fourteenth Amendment, religion simply does not occupy a place any more
significant than race. 21 In fact, race discrimination was the primary object of the
Fourteenth Amendment and thus should enjoy preferred treatment over religion.
That its language does not specifically refer to race should not make that focus
any weaker in light of the amendment's historical context and legislative
history.'1
2
This, of course, raises another potential objection. Under an "originalist" view
of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Amendment was meant to address racial
discrimination, and expansion of Fourteenth Amendment protections to other
concerns might reach matters outside of the scope of what was intended by the
Amendment's drafters. Yet, the Supreme Court has already rejected such a
narrow reading of the Fourteenth Amendment. In particular, it has rejected a
reading that would arguably restrict the beneficiaries of the Equal Protection
Clause to African Americans alone. Instead, the Equal Protection Clause is
applicable to all.' Similarly, it has interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment
guarantee of equality and liberty in a functional manner with respect to religious
freedoms. 2 1 In spite of the Fourteenth Amendment's focus on racial equality, the
case law has not made a distinction between the protection of religion from
federal, as opposed to state, actions. 4 Fourteenth Amendment incorporation has
simply resulted in guarantees that are coextensive. 2 The legal result has been
120. It has been suggested that the authors of the Fourteenth Amendment did not intend
to incorporate and extend the applicability of the Establishment Clause to the states.
Because a subsequent constitutional amendment proposal (the "Blaine Amendment")
sought to achieve such a result explicitly, such an amendment "would have been
superfluous ... if the Fourteenth Amendment had already made the Establishment Clause
binding upon the States." Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 257 (1962)
(Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan replied to this argument, arguing that the
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause work together to guarantee religious
liberty as it was incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment, and that the "religious
liberty embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment would not be viable if the Constitution
were interpreted to forbid only establishments ordained by Congress." Id. at 258
(Brennan, J., concurring).
121. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Moreover, the Fifteenth
Amendment, by making specific reference to race, makes explicit what is implicit in the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments-that race is a subject of particular concern to
the Constitution.
122. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291-97 (1978).
123. See supra note 120.
124. See, e.g., Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334-40
(1987) (involving an Establishment Clause challenge to federal legislation and citing
religion cases involving state actions, including Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602
(1971), as precedent for holding); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 602-
04 (1983) (same); see also Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet,
512 U.S. 687, 705 (1994) (involving an Establishment Clause challenge to state
legislation and citing Amos in support).
125. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1990) (applying the Free Exercise
Clause to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment);
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (applying the Establishment Clause to the
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that the protections afforded to individuals under the Fourteenth Amendment are
sufficiently broad to encompass all of the protections under the Religion Clauses.
Courts have taken a similar approach with respect to protections against race
discrimination by states and the federal government. Because the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause only protects against actions by states,
equal protection is made applicable to the federal government by the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. Nevertheless, the "'Court's approach to Fifth
Amendment equal protection claims has always been precisely the same as to
equal protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment."" 6 Thus, the scope
of racial equal protection with respect to state and federal government actions,
just like the protection of religious rights, is congruent. 7
Of course, the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause is the same as the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Accordingly, their protections
should be congruent as well. The conclusion one can thus reach is that just as the
state action protections of the Fourteenth Amendment for both religious and
racial minorities are congruent with the protections from federal government
actions,' the discrimination protections and notions of equality guaranteed with
respect to race are the same as those guaranteed with respect to religion. To the
extent that the Fourteenth Amendment applies certain notions of equality in the
religion context, those notions ought to be applicable to the race context as well,
unless there are inherent differences between race and religion that justify
differential treatment. In other words, the Fourteenth Amendment itself, the nexus
states through the Fourteenth Amendment).
126. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 217 (1995) (quoting
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975)). See generally Kenneth L.
Karst, The Fifth Amendment Guarantee of Equal Protection, 55 N.C. L. REV. 541 (1977)
(tracing the evolution of equal protection as it arose from the Fifth Amendment). The
Supreme Court has noted that equal protection guarantees under the Fifth Amendment
may be applied differently where the federal government acts in accordance with
"overriding national interests." Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 100 (1976);
see Karst, supra, at 560-62. One such exception may be Congress's special constitutional
power over aliens. See Hampton, 426 U.S. at 101-02 n.21.
127. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 224; Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) ("[I]t
would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the
Federal Government."). Kenneth Karst has called this overlap in functions the
"congruence" of the Due Process Clause with the Equal Protection Clause. See Karst,
supra note 126, at 552-58. "Thus, to the degree that a statute is (in equal protection
language) 'overinclusive,' it also invites a due process attack, since it restricts liberty
without justification." Id. at 547; see also Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The
Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341, 363 (1949) (noting the overlapping
guarantees of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses). Thus, whether the
protection of religious rights might come under an equal protection category of protected
fundamental rights or a suspect classification, the distinction is largely irrelevant since
the protections are the same.
128. Akhil Amar has argued that complete incorporation of the Religion Clauses into
the Fourteenth Amendment has actually changed the understanding of the Religion
Clauses, and focused the guarantees of the Religion Clauses more on the interests
affecting the individual. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100
YALEL.J. 1131, 1157-62 (1991).
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of protections for religious and racial minority groups, does not present an
impediment to, and does not require application of, a different notion of equality
in the race and religion contexts. To the contrary, to the extent that race and
religion are similar, they ought to be treated the same.
A review of how equal protection and due process have been and can be viewed
to provide similar protections to race and religion is in order.
2. Equal Protection
One of the main principles of religion and race jurisprudence is that
government classification based on religion or race is considered suspect under
the Equal Protection Clause'29 and subject to the same strict-scrutiny review. 3 '
In both instances, strict scrutiny review serves to screen out impermissible
government purposes in discriminating against minorities, including prejudice or
other invidious motives. To survive strict scrutiny review in both the religious
discrimination and the race discrimination context, a racial or religious
classification must be justified by a compelling governmental interest and be
narrowly tailored to its purpose.' Legislative intent for religious discriminatory
129. See United States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480, 1486 (1996) (upholding equal
protection component of Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause); McCleskey v. Kemp,
481 U.S. 279, 291 n.8 (1987) (stating Equal Protection Clause is violated if criminal
enforcement is based on an "'unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other
arbitrary classification."') (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962)); see also
Burlington N. R.R. v. Ford, 504 U.S. 648, 651 (1992) (observing that Montana's venue
rules do not classify "along suspect lines like race or religion"); New Orleans v. Dukes,
427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (noting that race, religion, and alienage are "inherently suspect
distinctions"); cf United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
130. See Choper, supra note 2, at 493-500; cf Employment Div., Or. Dep't of Human
Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886 n.3 (1990) (restating principle that laws burdening
religious exercise are subject to same scrutiny as racial classifications). Compare Church
of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 579 (1993) (Blackmum,
J., concurring) ("When a law discriminates against religion.. . , it automatically will fail
strict scrutiny . . . .") (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402-03, 407 (1963)
(omission added)), and Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982) ("[W]hen we are
presented with a... law granting a denominational preference, our precedents demand
that we treat the law as suspect and that we apply strict scrutiny."), with Adarand, 515
U.S. at 200, and Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) ("[LJegal
restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect
... [and] courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.").
131. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 901 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) ("[T]he
First Amendment unequivocally makes freedom of religion, like freedom from race
discrimination ... a 'constitutional norm,' not an 'anomaly."'); Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(suggesting that the compelling interest test is applicable to discrimination against
religious practices). Compare Lars9n, 456 U.S. at 247 ("[A] rule must be invalidated
unless it is justified by a compelling governmental interest ... and unless it is closely
fitted to further that interest .... ."), with Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227 (holding that all racial
"classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures that further
compelling governmental interests").
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laws has also been subjected to judicial scrutiny similar to that for racially
discriminatory legislation. 32
Finally, it has even been argued that the secular-purpose prong of the Lemon
v. Kurtzman.. test of the Establishment Clause has a parallel in equal
protection.' The "secular" purpose requirement of Lemon renders governmental
actions with "religious" purposes unlawful because of a lack of a lawful
objective.'35 "The requirement of secular purpose thus translates into an
injunction that government avoid pursuing objectives that manifest either
disrespect or favoritism for any particular religious affiliation or tradition."'36 The
equivalent restriction in equal protection doctrine-the absence of an invidious
motive to the disadvantage of a particular racial group-is "expressed in the
language of legitimacy" and in the requirement that "a classification ... be
explicable in light of an identifiable public good."' 37
132. See Church of the Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 540. Justice Kennedy analyzes the
legislative history of the religiously discriminatory statute at issue in a fashion similar to
that used in the equal protection context. See id.
The Court's opinion in Church of the Lukumi is somewhat unclear because even though
the justices were unanimous in the result, several concurring opinions arose. See id. at
522, 557-59. Because only Justice Stevens specifically joined the legislative intent
analysis of Justice Kennedy's opinion, and because Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Scalia specifically did not join in this part, it is unclear to what extent legislative intent
analysis for religious discrimination claims enjoys support from the Court.
133. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). To avoid running afoul of the Establishment Clause, Lemon
requires that (1) the government action have a secular legislative purpose, (2) its primary
effect neither advances nor inhibits religion, and (3) it does not foster excessive
government entanglement with religion. See id. at 612. The Lemon test has been the
subject of criticism by members of the Court and commentators. See e.g., Board of Educ.
of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 720-721 (1994) (O'Connor,
J., concurring); TRIBE, supra note 26, at 1210-13.
134. See Ira C. Lupu, Keeping the Faith: Religion, Equality and Speech in the U.S.
Constitution, 18 CoNN. L. REv. 739, 742-49 (1986). However, Ira Lupii also asserts that
there are significant differences between the two fields. See id. at 749-55, 761-69. Thus,
Lupu argues that a compelling state interest exists as a defense to a claim of race
discrimination, while no defenses to Establishment Clause claims exist. See id. at 753-54.
A finding of establishment, of course, is a legal conclusion that ends the Establishment
Clause inquiry, whereas a finding of race discrimination may not. But while labeling a
relevant factor in a legal analysis as ajustification defense to a claim as opposed to an
element of the claim has ramifications on who bears the burden of proof in a trial (and as
a result may affect the substantive outcome), such labels are of little importance in
determining the substantive legal merits of a claim. All factors must still be considered.
The Court appears to have essentially condoned the establishment of religion under a
"long-standing-practice" justification. See e.g., Epstein, supra note 84, at 2086. The legal
significance of discriminatory impact in both contexts is discussed infra Part II.C.
135. See Lupu, supra note 134, at 744.
136. Id. at 746. This prong of the Lemon test also promotes substantive equality
between religious practitioners and nonpractitioners. See also Paulsen, supra note 101,
at 326-3 1.
137. Lupu, supra note 134, at 744-45.
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3. Liberty and Due Process
The Due Process Clause not only provides procedural safeguards against
arbitrary treatment but also grants substantive protections aimed at preserving
personal dignity and autonomy. Guarantees of liberty also apply to "the right of
the individual... to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship
God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those
privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men."'3 In the free exercise context, this liberty guarantee has,
like the Equal Protection Clause, provided protection against discriminatory
treatment. 39 But unlike the Equal Protection Clause, the liberty guarantee has
given rise not only to the negative duty of avoiding discriminatory treatment, but
also to an affirmative duty to tailor government actions to relevant individual
religious differences, 4
Despite the prominence that religious liberty has occupied in this context, the
liberty guarantee of the Due Process Clause has also been applied more broadly
to protect an individual's cultural and ethnic self-definition. Thus, in Meyer v.
Nebraska, the Supreme Court invalidated a post-World War I prohibition on the
teaching of the German language before the eighth grade because it impeded the
ability of parents of German ancestry to impart their cultural characteristics, for
example, the German language, to their children.' 4' Even though the regulation
appeared to affect the children most directly, the prohibition also violated the
parents' -liberty interests because of the close connection between parent and
child."'42 Because controlling the cultural upbringing of one's offspring involves
the definition of one's self as it is passed on to one's children, interfering with a
parent's right to bring up his or her child interferes directly with the parent's
identity. Just as ancient Sparta's custom of withdrawing young boys from the care
of their families so as to "submerge the individual and develop ideal citizens" by
educating and training them in a uniform manner through the custody of the state
138. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
139. See, e.g., Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982).-
140. See, e.g., Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 138 (1987);
Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981);
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
141. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399, 401-03; see also Martha Minow, We, the Family:
Constitutional Rights and American Families, in THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN LIFE
299, 303 (David Thelen ed., 1988). The law was targeted at immigrants, whose primary
language was not English. By forcing them to give up part of their cultural
distinctiveness, the law sought to force quicker assimilation. See Meyer 262 U.S. at 401-
03; see also Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500, 524-25 (1925) (holding Philippine
law prohibiting Chinese merchants from keeping their books in Chinese, even if that was
their only language, violative of the Philippine equivalent of the Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clause).
142. Cf Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848 (1992) (citing Meyer as
authority).
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would violate due process of law, so too, the Meyer Court noted, did Nebraska's
prohibition on the teaching of the German language."'
Only a short time thereafter, the Court intervened again in Pierce v. Society of
Sisters' to invalidate a government prohibition on parochial school attendance.
Again, the state law interfered with parental rights to impart their sense of identity
and religious values to their children. In Pierce, the Court stated that the
government does not have any general power "to standardize its children by
forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is not the
mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the
right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional
obligations."'45 In this respect, "[t]he duty to prepare the child for 'additional
obligations' ... include[s] the inculcation of moral standards, religious beliefs,
and elements of good citizenship."'146 These elements are all integral to forming
a child's conception of self.
Both Meyer v. Nebraska and Pierce v. Society of Sisters acknowledged the
limits that the Due Process Clause imposes on the state's power to interfere with
an individual's cultural identity. At the heart of liberty protected by the Due
Process Clause "is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning,
of the universe, and the mystery of human life."'
147
In that respect, protection of the family and an individual's intimate relations,
including those of marriage 48 and procreation, 49 is a means of protecting those
human relationships which are integral to individual self-identity' and of
safeguarding "the ability independently [from unwarranted state interference] to
define one's identity[, an interest] that is central to any concept of liberty.'' A
143. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 402.
144. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
145. Id. at 535.
146. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972) (quoting Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925)).
147. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
148. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding state prohibition on
interracial marriage not only void based on equal protection grounds but also void based
on its deprivation of a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause).
149. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 835 (citing as authority Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965)).
150. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Associations, 89 YALE L.J. 624,
635-37 (1980).
151. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618-19 (1984). Thus, family life
plays a role in any definition of liberty:
[T]he personal affiliations that exemplify these considerations, and that
therefore suggest some relevant limitations on the relationships that might be
entitled to this sort of constitutional protection, are those that attend the
creation and sustenance of family-marriage, childbirth, the raising and
education of children, and cohabitation with one's relatives. Family
relationships, by their nature, involve deep attachments and commitments to
the necessarily few other individuals with whom one shares not only a
special community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distinctively
personal aspects of one's life.
Id. at 619-20 (citations omitted); see also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 203-06
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child, as a being created by the parents, is as much a part of each parent's
conception of self as each parent's own individual identity. 52 Governmental
interference with the transmission of cultural identity and values from parent to
child directly interferes with the parent's conception of identity and cultural
values.1
3
Protection of religious aspects of cultural identity has matured since the
incorporation of the Religion Clauses into the Fourteenth Amendment. Pierce can
accordingly be seen as a precursor to full incorporation. However, Meyer dealt
more broadly with conceptions of cultural identity, in particular with aspects of
language and ethnic identity. And with respect to conceptions of identity other
than religion, Pierce and Meyer continue to be of strong precedential value and
retain great vitality.'
(1986) (Blackmum, J., dissenting). In Bowers, the Court refused to recognize such a right
in regard to one's sexual orientation. See id. at 194-96. However, the Court did allow
states to accord some protection to orientation in Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
152. It is also this relationship between parent and child that was of crucial importance
to the Old Order Amish. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 222 (1972) (construing
Meyer v. Nebraska to suggest that exemption from compulsory education beyond eighth
grade may be necessary because education is "viewed as the preparation of the child for
life in the separated agrarian community that is the keystone of the Amish Faith"). The
right asserted there was that of the Amish parents to shape their children in their own faith
so that the children could be more easily integrated into Amish society. Because religious
beliefs and values were so central to Amish identity and because public education beyond
the eighth grade, when values incompatible with the Amish way of life would be taught,
would have interfered with formation of Amish beliefs and values, public high school
education was objectionable. See id. at 211-12. Only basic education that "does not
significantly expose their children to worldly values or interfere with their development
in the Amish community during the crucial adolescent period" was acceptable. Id. at 212.
Compulsory high school education would have destroyed the Old Order Amish church
community. See id. at 211.
153. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04 (1977) ("It is through
the family that we inculcate and pass down many of our cherished values, moral and
cultural."); see also Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 599 (1984) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (noting the constitutionally protected freedom to "cultivate familial
relations"); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 843-44 (1977)
("'[Marriage] is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in
living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects."')
(quoting Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486).
This view assumes of course that a child is an empty vessel, with no interest in cultural
identity independent of the parent. Limits to parental control over children and the
legitimacy of governmental concern over the rights of children with respect to their
parents have been recognized, see Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); see also
TRIBE, supra note 26, at 1299-1300, and include interests in ensuring that children are
not neglected or abused, see Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 604 (1979), and that the rights
of others are not interfered with, see Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 176-79 (1976).
154. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 848 (relying on Pierce and Meyer as governing
authority). The Court's willingness to extend the conscientious-objector exemption from
the federal draft to persons who oppose military service based on beliefs similar in nature
to religion, but not religious in nature, see Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 340-41
(1970), can be justified under this interpretation of the Due Process Clause.
However, Juan Perea has discounted Meyer as precedent for protections accorded to
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In spite of the Due Process Clause's interpretation as protecting an individual's
religious and racial/ethnic identity,' and in spite of the continued reliance on this
interpretation, it is only in the religion context that the affirmative-liberty
guarantee of due process has played a significant role.'56
II. RECONCILING THE JURISPRUDENCE OF RACE AND
RELIGION: TOWARD AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO
CULTURAL IDENTITY
A. Religion as the Primary Model
While a cultural model of religion and race in the law can bring a different
perspective to and illuminate difficulties in a number of doctrinal areas in race
and religion jurisprudence, it is also appropriate at this point to consider why it
might be justified as a normative matter to consider race issues through the
analytical frameworks created by the Court's religion jurisprudence. 7 After all,
the above comparison of religion and race jurisprudence shows that even though
both are similar in many respects, there are a number of doctrinal areas in which
religion is clearly a subject of preferred treatment over race.
First, as a nation we have had over 100 years' more experience, from the time
of the passage of the First Amendment to the Fourteenth Amendment, in dealing
with issues of religious equality rather than racial equality. As a result, there is
more institutional experience in dealing constructively with religious conflicts
ethnic identity because of Meyer's connection to the conception of substantive due
process born in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). See Perea, supra note 80, at
593. But see Ira C. Lupu, Untangling the Strands, 77 MICH. L. REv. 981, 988-89 (1979)
("[S]urvival of [Meyer and Pierce] ... suggests that the only durable objection to the
Lochner era's handiwork is that it generally selected the 'wrong' values for protection.").
155. This interpretation also provides a rationale for the equal protection guarantee that
the Court has found in the Due Process Clause. Because due process protects cultural
identity, it also protects individuals to some extent from being treated in a manner that
is totally contrary to their own conception of themselves, that is, treated as inferior and
unequal, instead of as full and equal human beings. Naturally, this viev of due process
and equal protection also shields even nonminority individuals as well as individuals
discriminated against based on a mistaken belief. In both instances, the individual's
identity is equally harmed.
156. For instance, in Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 362 (1991), because of the
case's posture as a peremptory strike challenge, foreign language-discrimination claims
were resolved under the Equal Protection Clause even though the more appropriate
analytical framework would have been the Due Process Clause. For a detailed discussion
of Hernandez, see Part II.C.
157. A converse approach has been suggested by David Steinberg, who argues that
religious accommodations should be analyzed under the Court's affirmative action
jurisprudence. See David E. Steinberg, Religious Exemptions as Affirmative Action, 40
EMORY L.J. 77 (1991). However, such an approach, if generally applied to religious
exemptions, would be highly unsatisfactory since there is no mandatory accommodation
equivalent in the race-equal-protection context. See discussion infra Part II.C.
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and frictions, in furthering the goal of equality, and in finding an appropriate role
for government in achieving such equality.
Another important reason for adopting religion jurisprudence as the primary
model is, as Ira Lupu has put it: "Long before constitutional doctrine recognized
the equality claims of racial minorities or women to treatment as equals, white
men could perceive the normative force and political efficacy of a requirement
that all religious affiliations be afforded equal respect and dignity.""' That has
simply been the result of the much greater societal penetration that religious
minority groups have been able to achieve in comparison to racial minorities.
Because religious differences have crossed more social lines, the experiences and
perspectives of religious minorities accordingly have been more readily
accessible to society at large than those of racial minorities,' 59 with attendant
consequences for what "whites" know about other racial minority groups. 60
Moreover, the numerosity and diversity of Protestant sects has impeded formation
of a unified dominant majority religious group in our society.' This form of
religious "diversity" has arguably led to a situation where perspectives of
religious rights are less dominated by a single majority and where society is more
sensitive toward religious minority groups simply because those in the majority
could more easily relate to the experiences and perspectives of the minority. 62
158. Lupu, supra note 134, at 745-46; see also Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 245
(1982) (noting that religious freedom "can be guaranteed only when legislators-and
voters-are required to accord to their own religions the very same treatment given to
small, new, or unpopular denominations").
159. The United States Supreme Court itself has been more religiously diverse than
racially diverse. Although the Supreme Court used to be the province of "white"
Protestant men, its first Catholic justice, Roger Taney, was appointed in 1836. Louis
Brandeis was the Court's first Jew in 1916. In contrast, the first woman, Sandra Day
O'Connor, did not join the Court until 1981. The first African American to join the Court
was Thurgood Marshall in 1967. At present, there are three Catholics and two Jews on
the Court. There are two women and one African American. There have never been any
Asian American, Latin American, or Native American justices. See THE SUPREME COURT
JUSTICES: ILLUSTRATED BIOGRAPHIES, 1789-1993, at 476, 506 (Clare Cushman ed., 1993);
Tony Mauro, The Court's Religious Conversion, LEGAL TIMES, July 1, 1996, at 8.
160. See Aleinikoff, supra note 89, at 1071-72.
161. See Lupa, supra note 134, at 743. In the sense that the overwhelming majority of
colonial, and later American, citizens were Christians, there has been one majority
religion. Arguably, this has resulted in the acceptance of ceremonial deism by the Court.
See Epstein, supra note 84. However, to the extent that the various Christian religious
sects do act monolithically, a countervailing force in the current politics of religion has
been irreligionists and other individuals with a weak sense of religious identity (i.e., their
interest in resisting movement toward affiliations by government with Christianity or any
religion generally).
162. Arguably, the overwhelming support for the congressional enactment of the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to bb-4 (1994)
(held unconstitutional by City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997)), passed in
response to the Supreme Court's decision affecting a Native American religion in
Employment Division, Oregon Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990), demonstrates this greater sensitivity toward religious minorities. See Destro,
supra note 7, at 8. But see Boerne, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (holding that the RFRA exceeded
Congress's power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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Linking the treatment of racial and religious minorities thus incorporates racial
minority groups into the existing reciprocity of perspectives between majority and
minority. 63 But more importantly, recognition of the similarities of race and
religion can help the majority understand what it means to be "on the outside
looking in" in the race as well as the religion context.'1
The religion model has demonstrated that the American ideal of tolerance for
differences, more fully implemented at some times than at others, has permitted
persons of differing cultural identities to coexist and work together to form a
nation. The experience has proven that tolerance and protection of varying
individual cultural identities can bring persons together by sending a message of
inclusion, as opposed to a message of exclusion and intolerance that is sent by
forced assimilation or conversion165
Of course, it is true that the religious minority groups that have been most successful
at integrating with the majority have almost exclusively been "white." Yet, that should
not detract from the progress that integration has been able to achieve with regard to these
groups. It also arguably demonstrates that racial and religious exclusion are related and
simply different facets of the same phenomenon.
163. The lack of a reciprocity of perspectives has arguably been the most important
cause for the Supreme Court's sanctioning of discrimination against racial minorities in
the past. American history, from Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856),
to Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), to Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944), has borne this out.
In this regard, the Supreme Court's reliance on the continuing vitality of Korematsu,
the only case where an explicit racial classification was upheld after strict scrutiny
review, is very distressing. Even though Korematsu is today commonly known as
epitomizing the invidious role of racial prejudice in depriving a racial minority group of
American citizens of their civil rights, which recently resulted in a congressional apology,
see 50 U.S.C. § 1989 (1988), Korematsu's proposition that "[p]olitical judgments
regarding the necessity for the particular classification may be weighed in the
constitutional balance, [even though] the standard of justification will remain constant,"
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995) (quoting Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 299 (1978), and citing Korematsu, 323 U.S. at
214), remains unquestioned by the Court. Yet, it was precisely based on politically
expedient reasons, reasons based on racial prejudice, that led the Court to uphold
internment of Japanese Americans during World War II in spite of the heightened
scrutiny. This appears to remain valid even today.
164. Justice O'Connor has written:
[T]he Establishment Clause is infringed when the government makes
adherence to religion relevant to a person's standing in the political
community. Direct government action endorsing religion or a particular
religious practice is invalid under this approach because it "sends a message
to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political
community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are
insiders, favored members of the political community."
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)); see also Lawrence,
supra note 59.
165. See James U. Blacksher, Majority Black Districts, Kiryas Joel, and Other
Challenges to American Nationalism, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 407, 431 (1995-1996) ("Those
who contend that the Free Exercise Clause endorses affirmative state accommodation of
religions ... point out how well the First Amendment has already accomplished its
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Of course, adoption of the religion framework as a primary model does not
mean that its use is appropriate in all circumstances. Just as the principle of
accommodation in the religion context is applied differently depending on the
particular circumstances, the same principle can lead to different results if there
are relevant differences between race and religion. And in areas where religion
jurisprudence has affected and touched upon treatment of non-Christian religions
(e.g., where the fact that the majority religion in this nation is Christianity is
significant), such as ceremonial deism, greater circumspection in adoption of that
jurisprudence is justified.
*B. Pervasive Regulation of Race and Religion:
Nonentanglement and Segregation
Considering the functional similarities of race and religion suggests how very
closely related the principles underlying the various doctrines in the two fields
are. Just as the government is prohibited from being pervasively involved in
religion under the First Amendment,'66 the government is also prohibited under
the Equal Protection Clause from pervasively regulating race relationships, as the
Jim Crow system of segregation did prior to Brown v. Board of Education.'67
However, underlying the simple principle that segregation, whether by race or
by religion, is unlawful are deeper concerns related to governmental interference
with individual identity and the exclusion from the polity of those with a different
cultural identity. At one level, a pervasive regulatory scheme where government
defines and polices racial or religious identity impairs the autonomy of
individuals and their right to define themselves. Such regulation squarely collides
with the autonomy values protected by the Religion Clauses and the Due Process
Clause which allow one to define one's own conception of the self.16 At another
level, pervasive regulation of race and religion, by giving the stamp of
government approval to imposed labels of racial identity, has the potential for
institutionalizing and freezing in time racial and religious divisions, as
segregation previously did. 69 Opportunities for and the ability to form cross-
original objective of forestalling national disunity along religious lines.").
166. See Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687
(1994); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); see also Paulsen, supra note 101, at
345-46 (tracing the historical concept of how the prohibition on entanglement prevents
undue government influence of religion).
167. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see Christopher L. Eisgruber, Ethnic Segregation by
Religion and Race: Reflections on Kiryas Joel and Shaw v. Reno, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 515
(1995-1996).
168. See discussion supra Part I.D.3.
169. See MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE 117 (1990) ("The root of
prejudice is the separation between groups that exaggerates difference."). The Supreme
Court has frequently expressed its concern about the potential for affirmative action to
institutionalize racial divisions. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,
276 (1986) (Powell, J., plurality opinion) (observing that societal discrimination could
be used to "uphold remedies that are ageless in their reach into the past, and timeless in
their ability to affect the future"); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
298-99 (1978).
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racial and cross-religious relationships would be impaired, making it that much
more difficult for religious and racial minority groups to bridge differences with
other groups 17' and participate successfully in the political process' 7 Thus, some
benign forms of segregation, such as that at issue in Board of Education of Kiryas
Joel Village School District v. Grumet, 1 2 could in the long run inadvertently re-
create a system of oppression for such minority groups.
Yet, while the opposite of segregation-integration--can overcome the
physical separation between individuals of different cultural identities, integration
as practiced has been criticized as having failed to take into account, and as being
ineffective in overcoming, the social and economic inequalities resulting from
segregation. 73 Integration in the school desegregation context, for instance, has
largely failed to improve educational opportunities for racial minorities. Instead
it has provided incentives for those of better means to opt out, leaving only the
poor to be integrated. The result has been continued inequality in educational
opportunities, marking the formerly segregated group of people with the stigma
of inferiority. Of course, that failing alone cannot invalidate the necessity of
desegregation efforts. However, considering the underlying reasons for
segregation's impermissibility, physical desegregation alone is clearly not an
However, Karst has argued that present affirmative action programs do not create such
a danger. See Karst, supra note 33, at 344. Neil Gotanda has described "white supremacy"
as the Establishment Clause analog in the equal protection context. See Gotanda, supra
note 3, at 67.
170. See MINOW, supra note 169, at 117 ("Isolation itself may contribute to false views
of difference which impede mutual relationships."); Aleinikoff, supra note 89, at 1071-
72.
17 1. Viewed from a perspective that fostering commonalities between different cultural
groups is a desirable governmental activity, the secular-purpose-and-effect prong of the
Lemon test ensures that government focuses on purposes and effects that people can agree
on independent of their religious beliefs or nonbeliefs. In this sense, secular purpose and
effect is not an opposite of sectarian purpose and effect, but rather refers to purposes and
effects that transcend those of particular religions or have become so much a part of
American civic culture that they have taken on a nonreligious meaning. Cf Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 683 (1984) (asserting in dictum that display of religious
paintings in governmentally supported museums would not be an advancement of
religion); benMiriam v. Office of Personnel Management, 647 F. Supp. 84, 86 (M.D.N.C.
1986) (discussing the use of the Christian dating system). Of course, what has become so
much a part of American civic culture that it has taken on a nonreligious meaning is
subject to debate. See Choper, supra note 83; Ingber, supra note 83, at 310-15 (discussing
distinction of nonreligious matters, matters independent of religion/existence of sacred
or divine, and irreligious matters, which oppose or are hostile to religion, and arguing that
the nonreligious are not subject to the constraints of the Religion Clauses). Compare
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983) ("In light of the unambiguous and
unbroken history of more than 200 years, there can be no doubt that the practice of
opening legislative sessions with prayer has become part of the fabric of our society."),
with id. at 797 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that legislative prayer "is nothing but
a religious act").
172. 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
173. See generally Johnson, supra note 13.
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adequate and complete remedy for the effects of prior segregation, contrary to the
implications of some of the Court's recent pronouncements. 74
Instead, remedies to segregation must include promotion of individual self-
identity and self-worth, such as through improved educational opportunities. A
secure sense of self-identity allows individuals to be more tolerant of racial and
religious differences and thus bridge such differences more easily. Minority group
members can approach relationships with members of other religious and racial
groups as equals. The improvements in interactions 7 1 can lead to social and
political coalitions based on issues of common interest, and can accentuate the
commonalities, as opposed to the differences, that the minority and majority
share. Resulting tolerance and respect can promote the fading of racial divisions
as they largely have for religious divisions.
C. Formal vs. Substantive Equality: Mandatory Religious
Accommodations, "Cultural" Accommodations, and
Washington v. Davis
In the religion context; the Court has generally approached protections for
religious minority groups by considering both tenets of substantive
equality-treating "like cases alike" and "different cases differently.' 76
Regardless of the motivation for government actions that burden religious free
exercise, accommodation of particular religious practices is required where such
actions impose an undue burden on free exercise and do not involve a compelling
governmental interest, and where an exemption would not substantially hinder the
fulfillment of the governmental interest. 77 In this respect, mandatory
174. See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992); see also Greene, supra note 2, at 31-
35. But see Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 272 (1977) (approving district court
decree requiring, in addition to a pupil reassignment plan for Detroit school system, a
number of "educational components," including remedial reading, revised testing and
counseling programs, and training programs for teachers).
175. Cf. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 315 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("It is one thing for a white child to be taught by a white teacher that color,
like beauty, is only 'skin deep'; it is far more convincing to experience that truth on a
day-to-day basis during the routine, ongoing learning process."). It is in this context that
affirmative action programs must be considered. See infra Part II.D.2.
176. See discussion supra Part I.D. 1. However, Abner Greene has recently argued that
the Court is moving toward using the same approach in religion cases that it is presently
following in race cases-treating like cases alike. See Greene, supra note 2, at 63-70.
177. See Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (plurality opinion); Jensen v. Quaring,
472 U.S. 478 (1985); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398 (1963). The Court has stated:
Where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon conduct
proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies such a benefit because of
conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure on
an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs, a burden upon
religion exists. While the compulsion may be indirect, the infringement upon
free exercise is nonetheless substantial.
Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 717-18 (1981).
The availability of mandatory religious accommodation appears to have been restricted
[Vol. 73:119
RACE, RELIGION, AND CULTURAL IDENTITY
accommodation doctrine' has proven itself to be uniquely suited to protect
members of religious minorities unable to obtain relief from the unusual burdens
of otherwise religion-neutral laws.'"
But, while the Court has pursued a goal of substantive religious equality by
looking to discriminatory effects, 8 ' race jurisprudence has largely implemented
only formal notions of equality, in which "like cases are treated alike."'' The
in Employment Division, Oregon Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990), which held that criminal drug prohibitions need not be tailored to provide
religious exemptions to a peyote user to ease incidental effects on free exercise rights,
regardless of the severity of the burden on the religious practitioner. See also City of
Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2161 (1997) (stating that "Smith held that neutral,
generally applicable laws may be applied to religious practices even when not supported
by a compelling governmental interest") (case name not italicized in original). However,
Smith has been severely criticized, by, among others, Justice Souter who joined the Court
after Smith and who has called for its reexamination, See Church of the Lukumi Babalu
Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 559-77 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring); see
also Pepper, supra note 49, at 35-37. Justice O'Connor, in her concurrence in Smith,
characterized the decision as particularly involving a significant interest by the state in
combating drug dealing and addiction. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 904 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
Subsequent to Smith, the state of Oregon approved a legislative accommodation for
religious peyote users. See Greene, supra note 2, at 78 n.318.
178. Mandatory accommodation is called for by the Free Exercise Clause and is to be
distinguished from legislative (or permissive) accommodations that are undertaken by the
government on its own. It is neither required by the Free Exercise Clause nor prohibited
under the Establishment Clause. See, e.g., Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos,
483 U.S. 327 (1987); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 222 n.11 (1972) (discussing
exemption in 26 U.S.C. § 1402(h) for Old Order Amish from obligation to pay social
security taxes); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971); Abington Sch. Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (supporting the
unconstitutionality of required Bible recitations in public schools); Zorach v. Clauson,
343 U.S. 306 (1952) (holding school district policy permitting children to leave school
early in order to attend classes in religious instruction elsewhere is constitutional);
McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (prohibiting religious instruction on
premises during school hours). Legislative accommodations are thus related to racial
affirmative action programs. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); Regents
of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Greene, supra note 2, at 70. But see
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
179. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a
Response to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 685, 693 (1992); see also Ira C. Lupu,
Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The Case Against Discretionary
Accommodation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 555 (1991) (arguing that Religion
Clauses protect only formal religious equality and that mandatory accommodation is
preferable over legislative (permissive) accommodation).
180. Of course, the Court's terminology in those cases is cast in the language of
burdens on free exercise. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403. But in order for the Court to
determine whether a burden is truly a burden for free exercise purposes, it has had to
resort to comparisons with the treatment of other religions by government. See id. at 406;
see also Smith, 494 U.S. at 879-98 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
181. See supra Part I.D.1.
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landmark case for this approach is Washington v. Davis,'82 where the Court held
that claims of discriminatory effects alone in government action were insufficient
to support an equal protection claim. Davis has been the subject of much
criticism, and I will not repeat that appraisal here.' Suffice it to say that when
integral parts of an individual's cultural (racial or religious) identity are involved,
actions or laws adopted "in spite of" rather than "because of' the discriminatory
effects on members of racial minority groups can demean an individual's dignity
just as much as intentional discrimination.'84 And when less burdensome options
are available that impose fewer costs on nonminorities,'85 and majoritarian
politics decline those options for convenience' sake, the result is little different
from a situation where racial hatred is the deciding factor"' 6 -important concerns
of and burdens on minorities are ignored by government because their social and
182. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
183. It has been suggested that the result in Davis was driven by the Court's perception
that the relief called for by the effects of past discrimination was beyond the power of the
court. See TRIBE, supra note 26, at 1451, 1511-12 (stressing legitimating function of
courts); Hall, supra note 15, at 71-72; Eric Schnapper, Perpetuation of Past
Discrimination, 96 HARV. L. REV. 828, 850-51 (1983) (arguing that innocence of
government can serve as limitation on remedy but not as defense to liability); Kathleen
M. Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HARV.
L. REV. 78, 89 (1986) (terming this approach the "sin-based" paradigm). But while the
Court's holding may have been correct in denying relief for reasons of its inability to
remedy general societal and past discrimination, the Court's reasoning and broad holding
that a discriminatory effect is irrelevant is not justifiable.
184. Justice O'Connor herself has noted that burdens "that, in effect, make
abandonment of one's own religion or conformity to the religious beliefs of others the
price of an equal place in the civil community" violate the guarantee of religious equality.
Smith, 494 U.S. at 897-98 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasis added).
It is this recognition that neutral laws can impose burdens and thus discriminate against
minorities that leaves one puzzled by the Court's statement in Davis that "we have
difficulty understanding how a law establishing a racially neutral qualification for
employment is nevertheless racially discriminatory." Davis, 426 U.S. at 245.
185. In Davis, the Court was asked to adopt the Title VII standard as an Equal
Protection Clause test for discriminatory impact. That test, applicable in employment
discrimination cases under the federal civil rights laws, would have imposed a fairly
minimal burden and would not have compromised the ability of the government to select
qualified candidates, though it would have prevented the use of criteria irrelevant to the
particular government program at issue. See Davis, 426 U.S. at 246-47. This test largely
parallels the inquiry in the application of mandatory religious accommodations.
While in the particular context of Davis, application of such a test would not have
changed the result since the Court determined that the program's qualification criteria
were relevant for Title VII purposes, see id. at 248-52, the use of Title VII itself in the
employment discrimination context has proven to be a workable standard designed to
eliminate from consideration those criteria that are not related to job qualifications.
186. It is precisely because racial minorities are unable to use the political process
effectively to avert such harms, whether imposed "in spite of" less burdensome
alternatives or "because of' racial prejudice, that equal protection concerns are triggered,
as in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), and that
covert racial discrimination, cloaked in the mantle of majoritarian politics and under the
guise of protection of the status quo, can escape the scrutiny of the Equal Protection
Clause. See Karst, supra note 33, at 338.
[Vol. 73:119
RACE, RELIGION, AND CULTURAL IDENTITY
political isolation prevents them from using their political power in the same way
as other groups. In that sense, Washington v. Davis17 bars a race equivalent under
the Equal Protection Clause to mandatory religious accommodations. 8'
But while Davis has created a bar to requiring substantive equality as a
constitutional matter under the Equal Protection Clause, Davis has no bearing on
equality concerns inherent in due process protections for liberty interests. In fact,
the protections of the Due Process Clause for an individual's cultural identity can
resolve the tension that Davis created with respect to notions of substantive
equality.
Because due process protections of liberty interests provide a guarantee of
substantive equality that is not available under the Equal Protection Clause, they
can provide a constitutional means of assuring substantive equality for
racial/ethnic minorities. Thus, just as the Due Process Clause protects religious
beliefs and identity, it can also be viewed as protecting other aspects of cultural
or ethnic identity more generally.'89 As a result, affirmative constitutional
protections along the lines of a requirement for religious accommodation should
also apply to personal attributes closely related to one's identity, such as
language, family relations, or matters that are of similar importance to an
individual. Hernandez v. New York,"9' indicates the receptivity of some members
of the Court to such a concept of "cultural accommodation,"'' in particular in the
context of accommodating the linguistic quandaries of bilingual jurors.
Hernandez involved a Latino criminal defendant's claim of racial
discrimination with respect to a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to
remove English-Spanish bilingual Latino members from a petite jury venire.92
187. 426 U.S. 229.
188. Even though using judicially mandated affirmative action programs as a remedy
to discrimination claims, see United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987); Local
Number 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986), can be
seen as an attempt to remedy past discrimination, that is, treating different cases
differently, they are not equivalent to mandatory accommodation. Court-sanctioned
affirmative action programs are imposed only upon a showing of intentional
discrimination and appear themselves to be subject to the same strict scrutiny test as other
forms of affirmative action. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469
(1989); Stuart v. Roache, 951 F.2d 446, 449 (1st Cir. 1991). Thus, except for being
imposed by a court, court-sanctioned affirmative action is more similar to ordinary forms
of discrimination remedies or legislative affirmative action programs. See discussion infra
Part II.D.
189. See supra Part I.D.3.
190. 500 U.S. 352 (1991).
191. Accommodation outside of the religion context, though only mandated by
Congress, has made its appearance in the Americans with Disabilities Act. See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12,101, 12,112(b)(5)(A) (1994). See generally id. §§ 12,101-213 (1994).
192. See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 352, Discrimination against individuals whose primary
spoken language is a language other than English can be subject to equal protection
scrutiny because language is often used as proxy for race or ethnicity. Those excluded
would largely be individuals of non-English-speaking ethnic or racial ancestry. See, e.g.,
Antonio J. Califa, Declaring English the Official Language: Prejudice Spoken Here, 24
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 293 (1989); Juan F. Perea, Demography and Distrust: An Essay
on American Languages, Cultural Pluralism, and Official English, 77 MINN. L. REV. 269,
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The prosecutor justified the peremptory challenges with his belief that bilingual
jury venire members might not accept as authoritative the English translation of
the testimony of anticipated Spanish-speaking witnesses. 93 Ordinarily, the trial
court's acceptance of the prosecutor's race-neutral explanation for the strikes
would have been the end of the defendant's Batson v. Kentucky' claim, because
lack of discriminatory intent forecloses an equal protection claim under Davis.'95
However, Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White
and Souter, refused to focus exclusively on the consequence of the Davis-effects
analysis, which would have left not only the defendant but also future bilingual
jurors with no recourse from being excluded on such a basis.
Instead, the Court avoided the analytical difficulty presented by Davis by
suggesting that ajudge might find a discriminatory intent by the prosecutor if the
prosecutor insisted on a challenge "in spite" of court-suggested alternatives to
exclusion of such jurors. For instance, the court could permit Spanish-speaking
jurors "to advise the judge in a discreet way of any concerns with the translation
during the course of a trial."' 96 In effect, the Court suggested in Hernandez that
courts ought to attempt to "accommodate"' 97 the obstacles faced by such
minorities in becoming jurors.'98
Of course, Hernandez was analyzed as an equal protection claim and not a due
process liberty claim, and thus Davis was controlling.'99 But Hernandez is
nevertheless important in indicating the Court's willingness to consider
accommodations for ethnic minorities that are equivalent to mandatory religious
accommodations in free exercise challenges. Hernandez is also one of the few
350-71 (1992); cf Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
193. See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 356-57.
194. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
195. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
196. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 364.
197. This is a term Justice Stevens used in describing judicial attempts at facilitating
linguistic minorities in becoming jurors. See id. at 379 (Stevens, J., dissenting). This
statement provides an interesting contrast to Justice Stevens's joinder in Justice Scalia's
concurrence in City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2172-76 (1997) (Scalia, J.,
concurring inpart), a case which sought to reaffirm Employment Division, Oregon
Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). One explanation, which
is consistent with the perspective here, may be that Justice Stevens views linguistic
accommodations on the same order of necessity and importance as the religious
accommodations in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), and Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398 (1963).
198. By the same token, peremptory challenges based on religious beliefs should raise
equal suspicions. See Davis v. Minnesota, 511 U.S. 1115, 1115-16 (1994) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in the denial of certiorari) ("'[O]rdinarily .... inquiry on voir dire into a
juror's religious affiliation and beliefs is irrelevant and prejudicial, and to ask such
questions is improper."') (quoting State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767, 771 (Minn. 1993)
(omission in original)).
199. Of course, Hernandez also peculiarly involved the special interests of criminal
trial defendants to a diverse jury under the Sixth Amendment as well as the court's
interest in the integrity and uniform use of and accessibility to the testimony presented
by all jurors. See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 361-63.
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cases20 0 where the Court has emphasized the importance and value of cultural
identity, and where it has attempted to protect such cultural attributes of the self,
such as language.2 ' In the Court's own words, a person's
preferred language, [is] the one chosen for personal communication, the one
selected for speaking with the most precision and power, the one used to
define the self.
Language permits an individual to express both a personal identity and
membership in a community, and those who share a common language may
interact in ways more intimate than those without this bond. 02
Thus, the Court recognized that assimilation of non-English-speaking citizens
into American society has put them into a catch-22 situation: Unless they speak
English, they cannot be eligible for jury service and thus assume all the attributes
of citizenship. On the other hand, if they do learn English, they may be subject
to potentially discriminatory treatment by a prosecutor.
In following the model of religious accommodations, mandatory cultural
accommodations would be triggered whenever neutral government action stifled
or repressed aspects of an individual's cultural identity, such as language,2 3
200. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Yoder, 406 U.S.
205; Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
201. Hernandez is also a product of the tension that Davis has created between the
notion of substantive equality and the Court's assimilation jurisprudence. This tension
resulted in even a staunch conservative such as Chief Justice Rehnquist joining Justice
Kennedy's opinion. See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 355.
202. Id. at 364, 370.
203. In that sense, English-only laws, such as the state law at issue in Yniguez v.
Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 1995), vacated as moot sub nom.
Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 117 S. Ct. 1055 (1997), which affirmatively
prohibit the speaking of a language other than English, as opposed to requiring English-
proficiency, would impair the right of minority cultural group members to maintain their
own identity different from that of the English-monolingual culture. See YINGER, supra
note 41, at 315-18. However, in the lower courts, Arizonans for Official English has been
analyzed only under free speech principles. The Supreme Court itself declined to resolve
the substantive issues and vacated the lower court's decision on mootness grounds. See
Arizonans for Official English, 117 S. Ct. at 1071.
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appearance,2" family relations,"' or customary dress. Cultural accommodations
would be required when no compelling governmental interests are implicated and
an exemption would not substantially hinder the fulfillment of the goal.20 6 And
since the limitation of Davis is confined solely to equal protection claims,
assertion of rights for ethnic and cultural accommodation under the liberty
guarantee of the due process clause would not be subject to the Davis
discriminatory-effect doctrine. None of the race-equal-protection cases, including
Davis or Hernandez, would constitute binding precedents. Instead, such rights
would be resolved under the due process line of cases, including those governing
religious accommodations.0 7
D. Inclusion and Exclusion: Affirmative Action and
Legislative Accommodation
One of the most salient characteristics of affirmative action and legislative
religious accommodation is that both are intended to make up for burdens or
obstacles that minority group members face because of their minority status.
Affirmative action programs, such as in employment, can help racial minority
members overcome obstacles, such as hidden personal and subconscious
prejudice, that nonminority members do not face in obtaining access to economic
opportunities. Similarly, legislative religious accommodations, such as the
conscientious-objector provision of the draft, can relieve the burdens of
government regulations of general applicability that would otherwise weigh
particularly heavily on the religious beliefs and practices of some minority groups
(because their lack of political clout prevents their particular concerns from being
taken into as much account as the concerns of those in the majority). To the
extent such legislation is not the result of the normal interest-group bargaining
204. See Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 251 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(arguing that governmental control over a citizen's personal appearance forces the
individual "to sacrifice substantial elements of his integrity and identity"); New Rider v.
Board of Educ., 414 U.S. 1097 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting from the denial of
certiorari); see also J. Harvie Wilkinson & G. Edward White, Constitutional Protection
for Personal Lifestyles, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 563, 600-11 (1977). In Kelley v. Johnson,
the Supreme Court did not resolve the issue of whether police officers had a
constitutionally protected liberty interest in personal appearance, such as personal
grooming, because it found a rational relationship between short hair and public safety
which trumped any liberty interest the officers may have had. See Kelley, 425 U.S. at 244-
48.
205. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 498-500 (1977). While the Court
declined to adopt sexual orientation as such a liberty interest in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186 (1986), the Court's most recent ruling in Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620
(1996), appears to cast some doubt on that holding.
206. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
207. In contrast, governmental actions explicitly directed at aspects of cultural identity
(e.g., like explicit racial or religious classifications), rather than indirectly burdening
individuals, would continue to be invalid per se. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833 (1992); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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over private benefits, and inasmuch as such legislation represents an attempt at
giving substance to overarching public values of substantive equality, both forms
of government actions are acts of governmental grace toward racial and religious
minority groups."' However, while the legitimacy of special governmental
treatment for religious minorities has been largely unquestioned, affirmative
action continues to be one of the most contentious public policy issues." 9 Part of
the contentiousness can be traced to a lack of consensus about what the
underlying justifications of affirmative action are2' 0 and to questions about
whether such justifications are legitimate.
Religious accommodations and racial affirmative action are considered by some
as necessary because many of the burdens that individuals of religious or racial
minority groups have to contend with cannot be remedied through the simple
application of constitutional protections. Particularly in the race context, not even
the application of antidiscrimination laws is sufficient. That is because the
burdens and obstacles that attach themselves to minority status are not simply the
consequence of what can be classified as state action subject to constitutional
strictures or the result of actions with an identifiable discriminatory purpose, or
the actions of a bigoted actor who can be punished. Rather, they are a
consequence of past discrimination, subconscious discrimination, discriminatory
effects of actions in the past, or forms of private discrimination or preferences
that cannot be prohibited by law.21' To relieve some of these special burdens,
government must take actions that lie outside of the scope of what is
constitutionally required.
Because both forms of government actions have been the subject of much
scholarly discourse, 212 1 will focus on aspects where a cultural identity perspective
provides additional insights on the Court's approach to these issues. Such an
analysis shows that the major criticisms directed at affirmative action have less
substance than might otherwise appear when compared to religious
accommodations, that diversity affirmative action is a narrowly tailored means
to achieving the compelling governmental interest of racial integration, and that
the Court's religious endorsement jurisprudence is based on an analytical
approach that is equivalent to the rationales underlying racial integration.
The point here, of course, is not to question the legitimacy of religious
accommodations generally. Indeed, such accommodations are frequently the
208. However, the less minorities remain outsiders, the less that characterization stays
applicable. Cf. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (arguing that
heightened scrutiny for city's racial affirmative action program was justified in part by
the fact that African Americans made up approximately 50% of city population and held
five of nine city council seats).
209. See supra Introduction.
210. See infra Part II.D.2.
211. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
212. See, e.g., GABRIEL CHIN ET AL., BEYOND SELF-INTEREST 1171-78 (1996); Drew S.
Days, III, Fullilove, 96 YALE L.J. 453 (1987) (discussing affirmative action); Lawrence,
supra note 59 (discussing racial discrimination and unconscious racism); Ira C. Lupu, The
Trouble with Accommodation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 743 (1992) (discussing religious
accommodation); McConnell, supra note 179 (discussing religious accommodation).
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expression of the most noble government ideals as attempts to alleviate undue
burdens on the free exercise of religion by small faiths. Rather, it is to
demonstrate that the criticisms that have been directed at affirmative action are
simply not unique and have been accepted in contexts that raise the same
concerns about protection of aspects closely connected to individual identity.
1. Criticisms of Affirmative Action: Of Stigmatic Injuries,
"Incidental Burdens" on "Innocent Victims," and Free
Riders
Even though affirmative action is intended to and does help members of some
racial minority groups, it has been criticized as being just as pernicious as
invidious forms of racial classification.2"3 Yet, religious accommodation
jurisprudence demonstrates clearly that the Court has found ways and does
distinguish between government actions that burden minorities and those that help
them.2" 4 A comparative examination of three of the most commonly raised
criticisms of affirmative action-that it is unacceptable because it (1) imposes
stigmatic injuries, (2) imposes incidental burdens on nonbeneficiaries, and (3)
provides benefits to free riders-illustrates that affirmative action is little
different from religious accommodations. All three imperfections exist in
legislative accommodations as well. Yet, they do not raise the same level of
concern there because the legitimacy of religious accommodations has not been
seriously questioned.
Affirmative action, for instance in employment or education, is criticized for
imposing a stigma of inferiority. It is thought to devalue and stigmatize the
achievements and qualifications of racial minorities who are targeted
beneficiaries of such programs, regardless of whether a particular individual
actually benefited from such a program, because such programs supposedly lower
eligibility standards or qualification requirements for minorities.
However, this criticism is not uniquely applicable to affirmative action. It also
applies to many legislative accommodations that were designed to promote free
exercise. One example is the conscientious-objector exemption from the military
draft, when it was in effect. While the conscientious-objector exemption was
originally designed to further free-exercise rights by relieving from the draft those
213. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237-39 (1995) (Scalia &
Thomas, JJ., concurring) (overruling Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990));
Croson, 488 U.S. at 520-28 (Scalia, J., concurring).
214. See Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987); Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952). Without
exception, religious accommodations are benign because they provide more choices and
options to religious practitioners. Affirmative action programs do exactly the same. See
Adarand, 515 U.S. 200; Croson, 488 U.S. 469; Wygant v. Jackson Bd. Of Educ., 476
U.S. 267 (1986); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). The
religious practitioner or racial minority group member can opt out of the particular
program, either by declining to specifically take part in it or by declining to identify
oneself as a member of a minority group. In contrast, invidious discrimination restricts
choices. Unfortunately, the Court has ignored that important distinction. See Adarand,
515 U.S. 200.
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religious practitioners who could not participate in war as a matter of religious
belief,215 it also exposed those who did take advantage of it to the potential stigma
of cowardice. A similar potential stigma criticism also applies to the "released
time" program in Zorach v. Clauson,"6 that permitted students to leave the school
premises for religious instruction off-premises during regular school hours. Since
the "released time" program singled out the students who took advantage of the
program, their participation potentially stigmatized such students as individuals
who did not belong with the rest of the students-it potentially made them
outsiders. Finally, the exemption to the bar on religious discrimination in
employment leaves members of religious organizations that use that exemption
open to the charge of being religious bigots. Yet, all of these programs and
exemptions have been found constitutionally permissible by the Supreme Court.2"7
That, of course, should not come as a surprise. Programs which award benefits
on the basis of criteria entirely unrelated to personal "merit" or achievement2 8
exist both within and outside government. A few such examples are veterans
preferences in government employment,2 9 alumni legacy preferences in college
admissions,' 0 and small-business government-contracting preferences." All such
programs have the potential of exposing their beneficiaries to a stigma of inferior
ability by virtue of the disjunction of benefit and personal "merit." Yet, such
programs are constitutionally permissible.
The reason why legislative accommodations, as well as other special benefits
programs, are viewed as legitimate, and concerns about stigmatic harms are not
215. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965); The Selective Draft Law Cases,
245 U.S. 366, 374 (1918). The Supreme Court has held that the conscientious-objector
provision covers not only religious-belief-based objections to military service but also
beliefs that are equivalent to religious beliefs. See Seeger, 380 U.S. at 173. Nevertheless,
that does not detract from the fact that the exemption was obviously originally conceived
as a religious accommodation with religious objectors in mind.
216. 343 U.S. 306, 309-10 (1952). It is unclear whether Zorach would survive
Establishment Clause review today. See Lupu, supra note 212, at 744-45.
217. While Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), involved a mandatory
accommodation, the special benefit granted to Ms. Sherbert could have easily subjected
her to suspicions of laziness for her refusal to work on a Saturday. See id. at 407. Instead,
she is commonly viewed as having legitimately been unable to satisfy her job's work
requirement of Saturday work because of her religious beliefs. Of course, that is in the
nature of accommodations-they are granted based on the recognized legitimacy of free
exercise. See John H. Garvey, Freedom and Equality in the Religion Clauses, 1981 Sup.
CT. REV. 193, 210-14.
218. Of course, the notion of "merit" itself or its definition varies according to the
particular circumstances and can be manipulated.
219. See, e.g., Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979); Bakke, 438
U.S. at 406 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
220. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 404 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
221. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C.A. § 636(a) (West 1997) (authorizing Small Business
Administration ("SBA") to make loans for qualified small business concerns); 15
U.S.C.A. § 644(i)-(j) (West Supp. 1997) (permitting federal agencies to designate set-
aside contracts for small business concerns and mandating such a set-aside for contracts
with a value of between $2500 and $100,000); Government Contracting Programs, 13
C.F.R. § 125 (1997) (SBA regulations regarding set-asides).
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given much weight, is simple. In its own nature, stigma arises not out of the
special benefits that the beneficiary has received, but rather out of continuing
prejudice, preexisting beliefs in the inherent inferiority of the affirmative action
beneficiary, or unquestioned acceptance of the stigma theory itself. Beliefs of
inferiority of another race, and the resulting stigmatic harm, are thus not the result
of affirmative action programs2 per se, but rather a continuing expression of the
evil that is to be cured. By continuing to be expressed through the devaluation of
the achievements and successes of racial minority members, racial prejudice
continues to exist in a covert form rather than in the open.223
But while private prejudice is outside the reach of governmental regulation, that
alone cannot justify government acquiescence (such as refusal to take remedial
actions) to such prejudices. Religion jurisprudence has recognized that important
principle in its more general prohibition on the government's adoption or
expression of religious tenets of a particular group of citizens.224 Doing so in the
race context would sanction and validate racial prejudice, and the law has not
done otherwise.225 Charges of stigma are largely a disingenuous attempt to
undermine otherwise legitimate forms of aid to racial minorities.
Another criticism of affirmative action is its alleged unfairness to those who are
ineligible for such programs. Because many of the persons who are ineligible for
222. See, e.g., Bakke, 438 U.S. at 375-76 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
223. See, e.g., Aleinikoff, supra note 89, at 1091-92 (discussing race-conscious
policies); cf BARBARA R. BERGMAN, IN DEFENSE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 138-41 (1996)
(arguing that stigma is applied to affirmative action program beneficiaries, in the gender
and race contexts, as a means of resisting such programs rather than as an independent
indication of the merits of such programs); TRIBE, supra note 26, at 1571-77 (discussing
use of one gender discriminatory practice to justify another). Charles Lawrence has
proposed a "cultural meaning" test to identify subconsciously discriminatory actions. See
Lawrence, supra note 59, at 328, 355-81.
224. Under the Establishment Clause, the government cannot express the values of a
particular religion. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 602-03 (1971). Similarly, even
in the sex-discrimination context, government is not permitted to give effect to social
stereotypes. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996) (noting that
gender roles are product of culture); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
225. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 316-17 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("[C]onsideration of whether the consciousness of race is exclusionary or
inclusionary plainly distinguishes [a] valid purpose.., from a race-conscious decision
that would reinforce assumptions of inequality.") (citing Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429
(1984)); Palmore, 466 U.S. at 430-34 (holding that child custody could not be denied to
white mother based on societal prejudice her child might encounter due to prospective
stepfather's race); Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955) ("[T]he
vitality of [the] constitutional principles [set forth in Brown 1] cannot be allowed to yield
simply because of disagreement with them."); see also Pennsylvania v. Board of Dirs. of
City Trusts, 353 U.S. 230, 230-31 (1957) (per curiam); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1
(1948) (prohibiting courts from enforcing private racially restrictive covenants on
property). It is for these same reasons that rationales of "white backlash" or reinforcement
of stereotypes, which also inherently arise out of the evil to be cured, do not justify
finding affirmative action programs unconstitutional, though they may bear on legislative
policy choices about affirmative action.
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affirmative action programs are arguably blameless or "innocent" of the
discrimination that necessitates affirmative action in the first place, such
programs are viewed as depriving them of legitimately expected benefits. Under
this rationale, it is unfair to force an individual who has not contributed to the
discrimination that minorities have experienced to bear the burdens that
remedying that discrimination entails. For instance, an affirmative action program
might be viewed as imposing burdens on "innocent" third parties because it
narrows the employment or advancement opportunities of such individuals.226
Yet, the notion that government programs might "incidentally" burden those
who do not benefit is not uncommon. Even though the Court has demanded in the
religious accommodation context that legislative accommodations not unfairly
burden the rights of others, z 7 incidental burdens on the majority frequently occur
and are accepted by the Court as an unavoidable by-product. 8 Indeed, the notion
of imposing burdens, such as through taxation or other government regulation,
broadly on the citizenry, regardless of individual fault, and distribution of
benefits based on criteria other than individual merit or "just dessert," is at the
heart of most public-purpose legislation, such as our progressive tax system or
welfare laws. In fact, the legislative accommodation programs that the Court has
approved in recent times have imposed significant burdens on non-beneficiaries,
sometimes far beyond those imposed on non-beneficiaries of affirmative action
programs.22 9
For instance, in Zorach v. Clauson,20 the school's released-time program
required students who did not participate in released-time religious instruction to
spend that hour with no instruction, not even an opportunity for them "to use
226. The Court has indicated that some burdens on "innocent" persons are acceptable.
See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 280-81 ("As part of this Nation's dedication to eradicating racial
discrimination, innocent persons may be called upon to bear some of the burden of the
remedy."); cf Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 230, 235 (1995) (stating
that an individual suffers injury when disadvantaged based on his or her race, "whatever
that race may be," but declining to indicate whether any such burden would invalidate an
affirmative action program); id. at 247 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
majority's decision to discriminate against a minority is "fundamentally different from
[a] decision to impose incidental costs on the majority ... to provide a benefit to a
disadvantaged minority").
The legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment indicates that programs that were
enacted to exclusively benefit the then recently freed slaves did consider unfairness
against "whites" but accepted such unfairness as justified. See Schnapper, supra note 110,
at 753. The Supreme Court in Bakke rejected this legislative history as no longer relevant
today because American society is no longer made only of "black" and "white." See
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 292-93.
227. See Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 722,
724 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472
U.S. 703, 709-10 (1985).
228. See McConnell, supra note 179, at 702-05.
229. But see Texas Monthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 18 n.8 (1989) ("[Prior] cases...
involve[d] legislative exemptions that did not, or would not, impose substantial burdens
on nonbeneficiaries. .. ").
230. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
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school hours for spiritual or ethical instruction of a nonreligious nature."'" In that
respect, the so-called "dead hour 2 32 was designed to ensure that the released-time
students did not miss anything of importance while gone and thus were not put at
a disadvantage because of it.
In Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos,233 the Court held the
exemption of religious employment discrimination laws 4 to be permissible even
though it permitted religious organizations to engage in religious discrimination
not only in their religious activities but also in their secular activities. 235 Even
though the rationale-that the exemption removed government from religion and
promoted goals of nonestablishment and free exercise-may be easily accepted
when the exemption is used to prevent an atheist from suing a Catholic church for
being denied a job as a priest, the burden the exemption imposes becomes more
difficult to accept and seems unjustified when it reaches clearly secular aspects
of a church, for instance where a church discriminates on the basis of religion in
filling janitorial positions.
Finally, in Gillette v. United States, 2 6 the Court upheld a military draft
exemption, even though the burden on those without religious objection to war
(i.e., the increased chance of being drafted and forced to risk one's life in battle)
was substantial. 7 To an individual who had to serve and risk his life in combat
in the stead of a conscientious objector who was exempted from military service,
such a burden would appear to be quite significant. Yet all of these programs
were found constitutionally permissible.23
Again, just as in the stigma context, incidental burdens on nonbeneficiaries of
governmental programs are not unique to the accommodation and affirmative
action context. In fact, such incidental burdens also arise in numerous other
government programs, 239 including veterans preferences in government
employment, SBA-targeted benefits, and alumni legacy preferences in admissions
to colleges receiving public funds. The reason for such incidental burdens arises
231. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 361 n.13 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
232. See Lupu, supra note 212, at 743-45. But see Bullock, 489 U.S. at 18-19 & n.8.
233. 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (upholding exemption for churches from religious
discrimination prohibition under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-1).
234. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1994).
235. See Amos, 483 U.S. at 437.
236. 401 U.S. 437, 461-62 (1971).
237. See Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 725
(1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
238. See e.g., Texas Monthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 18 n.18 (1989) (suggesting that
Zorach and Amos did not impose substantial burdens on nonbeneficiaries). Even in Sherbert
the court reasoned that its mandated accommodation of a Sabbatarian was permissible because
the accommodation did not impose any burdens on others. Yet, the accommodation imposed
a burden on all taxpayers who were not Sabbatarians to support Ms. Sherbert for her different
religious belief. In that respect, Sherbert is similar to federally funded race-based scholarship
programs.
239. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 318-19 (1983) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (comparing lay-off protections for teachers based on race to lay-off
protections that might be afforded to giftea young teachers with specific expertise).
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out of the nature of limited benefit programs. Whenever government sets aside
scarce resources, provides limited access to such resources, or exempts some, but
not all, persons from an otherwise general requirement, those excluded will not
have access to those resources or may have to make up for those who are
exempted from the general requirement. As a result, nonbeneficiaries will
perceive their exclusion from the benefit or the requirement to mhake up for the
exemption of others as a burden.24 ° Incidental burdens are plainly not unique to
affirmative action.24'
Of course, these considerations have always been important in the Court's
handling of affirmative action programs as well as religious accommodations.242
How to determine when such burdens become substantial enough to be
constitutionally impermissible is the difficult question that the Court has
struggled with for a long time.243
240. Of course, incidental burdens on minorities resulting from laws of general
application are a common and accepted part of constitutional jurisprudence.
241. Cf. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 375 (1978) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). But see Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 709-10 (1985)
(invalidating a legislative accommodation requiring that Sabbath-day observers be given
that day off based in part on the rationale that the employers and other employees would
be substantially economically burdened).
Of course this does not mean that being a member of the majority race insulates one
against racial discrimination. But it does mean that affirmative action does not impose the
stigmatic injury on nonbeneficiaries as invidious forms of discrimination do. See
Wasserstrom, supra note 112, at 592-94 (arguing that segregation of bathroom facilities
based on race, as opposed to sex, is objectionable because it degrades "black" persons
whereas the same is not true for sex segregation of bathrooms); Ronald Dworkin, Why
Bakke Has No Case, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Nov. 10, 1977, at 11, 15 (pointing out that while
a "white" person with a lower test score might have been accepted if he were "black," "it
is also true, and in exactly the same sense, that he would have been accepted if he had
been more intelligent, or made a better impression in his interview.... Race is not, in his
case, a different matter from these other factors equally beyond his control.") (emphasis
in original).
242. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 276 (1995) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting) ("Court review can ensure that preferences are not so large as to trammel
unduly upon the opportunities of others or interfere too harshly with legitimate
expectations of persons in once-preferred groups."); Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S.
547, 596-97 (1990) (holding race-conscious programs permissible if they do not "impose
undue burdens on nonminorities") (emphasis in original), overruled by Adarand, 515
U.S. 200; Wygant, 476 U.S. at 282-84; see also Dorf, supra note 64; McConnell, supra
note 179, at 702-03; Sullivan, supra note 183, at 87-89.
243. Cf Dorf, supra note 64. The Court has indicated that some interests weigh more
heavily in this calculus than others. Thus, one may have a stronger interest in retaining
a job than in obtaining a new job. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 282-84. Implicit in such
balancing is another judgment about the legitimacy of an expectation and the weight of
a long-held expectation. Thus, it has been suggested that:
Any claim of innocent third parties to be free from harmful consequences
rooted in past discrimination is not superior to the constitutional rights of
equally innocent black victims. When the burdens of past [and present]
discrimination cannot be eliminated entirely, they should be distributed as
equitably as possible among blacks and whites alike. Limiting a remedy is
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On one end of the spectrum, the most unobjectionable form of affirmative
action imposes diffuse burdens on the society at large. This form is most
appropriate when disadvantages have been the result of broad societal
discrimination. Special government appropriations for programs benefiting
minorities, such as certain government-funded, minority-targeted scholarships or
other set-asides of public benefits, would fall within this category. Since such
programs impose only a diffuse tax burden and create a new program benefit to
which no preexisting expectations apply, burdens on third parties would be
minimal.244
On the other end of the spectrum, affirmative action programs that work by
imposing substantial burdens on particular individuals would be the most
problematic. At the extreme, government would be attempting to remedy the
effects of racial discrimination by asking specific individuals to bear the burden
of helping racial minorities. If the government forced the transfer of property
from a "white" person, who purportedly benefited from general societal
discrimination against African Americans, to an African American in order to
even out a wealth differential, that would be clearly impermissible.
Quotas in educational admissions and government set-asides lie between these
two ends of the spectrum. Even though the Court has found both to be
impermissible in the absence of proven past discrimination,245 the common belief
that such programs burden nonminority group members by depriving them of
program benefits, such as university admission or a government contract, is
misguided. The burden imposed on individuals ineligible for such programs is not
the deprivation of benefits themselves, because such programs do not
automatically confer benefits but rely on a selective or competitive process.
Rather, the burden consists of a loss or reduction of opportunities in obtaining the
benefits.246
appropriate only when that remedy would inflict an injury on third parties
that substantially exceeds the harms suffered by the black victims.
Schnapper, supra note 183, at 846-47.
Greene has suggested that the balancing of benefits to a minority group against the
burdens on others should altogether be left to legislative judgment. See Greene, supra
note 2, at 82.
244. The Supreme Court has yet to rule on the permissibility of race-based
scholarships. But see Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.) (holding that any
consideration of race or ethnicity by state law school for purpose of achieving a diverse
student body was not a compelling interest which permitted law school to discriminate
on the basis of race in its admissions procedures), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2580 (1996).
245. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 228; Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 475-78
(1980); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289.
246. Perversely, the use of quotas and set asides should actually be less disruptive of
expectations in the long run than the more amorphous diversity system cited with
approval by Justice Powell, see Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315-18, because the official message
tells one right from the beginning what to expect-that those few slots are set aside for
members of disadvantaged minority groups. Based on that knowledge, no expectation of
benefit from that program or the benefits set aside should be formed at all. Cf Metro
Broad., 497 U.S. at 598-99 & n.51.
However, a system of quotas would elevate one governmental purpose over all others
even though government programs usually seek to achieve multiple aims through a single
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Thus, when a program, such as the admissions set-aside in Bakke, guarantees
a small number of program benefits for racial minority group members, the
burden imposed on all others is the loss of the opportunity to compete for those
set-aside benefits in common with all other program applicants. It is only after the
process of program beneficiary selection has run its course that a nonminority
group member can claim that he or she did not obtain the desired benefit, such as
admission to school. Yet, nonminority individuals who did not obtain the desired
benefit are, with respect to the unsuccessful bid for the government benefit,
similarly situated to minority individuals who did not obtain the desired benefit
either, even though eligible and considered for the set-asides. The difference
between the two is that the nonminority individual faced a reduced opportunity
in obtaining the benefit in comparison to the minority individual. Because the set-
asides were small in Bakke, for Mr. Bakke to have argued that he was unfairly
denied the particular medical school spot seriously misconstrues and exaggerates
the burden to which he was subjected.247 In reality, the burden he faced was only
the loss of opportunity.248 Of course, if the set-aside opportunity had been a
significant proportion of the total available opportunities, the substantiality of
such burdens would increase and his exclusion would have been much more
problematic. 24
9
means. It is in this sense that focusing on race as a single criterion for a set-aside may be
so unpalatable, whereas considering membership in a minority group as a "plus" in
addition to qualifications valuable for other program goals strikes a more acceptable
balance that is in that sense better and more narrowly tailored to the success of an overall
program. See Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 597-98; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317-18.
247. Similarly, Adarand Constructors could not claim that it actually lost the
subcontract it sought. Rather its harm was that the winning minority subcontractor was
provided with an advantage in obtaining the contract. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 263
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that although contractors are given an incentive to hire
minority subcontractors, they are not required to do so). How large the set-aside or
diminishment in opportunity will be is a separate question over which people may
disagree.
248. In this respect, the outcomes of these cases and the Court's rhetoric about
protecting the expectations of innocent third parties that are not protected in any other
setting have, in essence, permitted nonminority group members, that is, "whites," to assert
a property right in the advantages that being "white" confers. Not only does being "white"
mean that one has a right to an opportunity to obtain a government benefit, but in fact a
right to the benefit itself. See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARv. L. REv.
1707, 1724-45 (1993) (analyzing "whiteness" as a form of property); Schnapper, supra
note 183, at 847; see also Sullivan, supra note 183, at 80 (arguing that the Supreme
Court's focus on fault and proven past discrimination permits continued challenges to
affirmative action by "innocent victims" of such remedies); cf. TRIBE, supra note 26, at
1537 ("[B]ecause white expectations formed within a discriminatory historical context
are likely to be inflated, if not wholly unfounded, the level of compensation necessary to
relieve whites of the burdens properly attributable to affirmative action should be gauged
accordingly."). For a discussion that characterizes the Court's activities in this area as a
form of conservative judicial activism, see Chang, supra note 97, at 810-17.
249. While the Court in Bakke recognized that Bakke had only lost the chance to
compete for some of the medical school spots, it essentially equated that lost opportunity
with the loss of the benefit itself. See Bakke 438 U.S. at 319-20. According to the Court,
Bakke was
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A third criticism of affirmative action is that it permits windfalls to
"undeserving"25 or opportunistic members of racial minority groups. 25 To
determine the seriousness of this criticism, comparison to legislative
accommodations is again instructive.
Legislative accommodations usually benefit many more than those who actually
need it.252 In fact, any program that does not require proof that the beneficiary has
a sufficiently great need is bound to be overinclusive in distributing benefits.2"3
Thus, religious accommodation benefits given to an indifferent religious
practitioner, such as the additional hiring flexibility approved in Amos, increased
educational opportunities in Zorach, or decreased risk of injury or death in
Gillette, are simply benefits or opportunities not available to others-such
benefits are windfalls.5 4
As a result, permissive accommodations and affirmative action programs may
create some incentives for persons to join the benefited group and thus abuse the
program. However, such pretextual membership is unlikely. Not only does true
membership in such groups carry with it all the burdens that discrimination has
imposed and still is imposing on group members, but membership must also be
sincere. Just as the sincerity of religious beliefs and practices may be examined
in order to weed out pretextual membership, 25 so can the sincerity of an
individual's claim to membership in a particular racial minority group be
evaluated to screen out pretextual claims.25 6
never afforded the chance to compete with applicants from the preferred
groups for the special admissions seats. At the same time, the preferred
applicants have the opportunity to compete for every seat in the class....
[W]hen a State's distribution of benefits or imposition of burdens hinges on
ancestry or color of a person's skin, [the classification must be shown to be
necessary to promote a substantial state interest].
Id.
250. Usually, individuals are considered undeserving if they appear not to face any
special disadvantage and thus do not appear to have a special need for help.
251. See Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 636 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Sullivan, supra note
183, at 87-89; see also Myrl L. Duncan, The Future of Affirmative Action: A
Jurisprudential/Legal Critique, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 503, 516-20 (1982)
(discussing the effect of racial discrimination on minority group members).
252. Of course mandatory accommodations are not subject to this criticism because
they must be justified on a specific and compelling basis. See Lupu, supra note 134, at
741-53.
253. See William P. Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free
Exercise Exemption, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 357, 384 (1990).
254. See McConnell, supra note 179, at 701.
255. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 81 (1944).
256. For a discussion of mistaken or pretextual racial identification, see Karst, supra
note 42, at 335-37. See also Christopher A. Ford, Administering Identity: The
Determination of "Race" in Race-Conscious Law, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1231 (1994)
(discussing an instance of pretextual use of race and surveying different methods for
racial or group categorizations).
What is a greater difficulty in justifying affirmative action is the equivalency or
proportionality of potential benefits conferred by affirmative action in relation to the
detriments experienced by any particular individual. This feature seems to lie at the heart
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2. Permissible Forms of Affirmative Action: Diversity as
a Means of Integration
Reference to religion jurisprudence can also inform our thinking about
permissible forms of affirmative action. Affirmative action programs are clearly
permissible if they are implemented directly to remedy proven past
discrimination.257 In contrast, there is much less certainty about the permissibility
of other forms of affirmative action, in particular nonremedial forms.
2 5 8
Nevertheless, it is outside of the narrow compensatory forms, in the forward-
looking programs that seek to address current problems such as ongoing
discrimination, that we find the programs most similar to religious
accommodations. That is because religious accommodations, mandatory and
permissive, are designed to alleviate burdens on religious minority groups
resulting from present government actions or regulations. They are not designed
to address and compensate for past wrongs. The permissibility of forward-looking
programs that target particular religious minority groups for governmental help
suggests that similar forward-looking aid designed for the benefit of particular
racial minorities ought to be permissible as well.259
Diversity programs, recognized as .constitutional by the Court in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke2  and Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,26' are
such forward-looking forms of affirmative action. Of course, Metro Broadcasting
was overruled by the Court only a few years ago in Adarand Constructors, Inc.
of free-rider arguments against affirmative action. However, just like burdens on others,
benefits to those who are unaffected by discrimination or disproportionate benefits should
be factors to be weighed in formulating an affirmative action program.
257. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); Days, supra note 212, at 453.
258. Other grounds that have been cited as justifications for affirmative action include
the present effects of past discrimination, and ongoing discrimination that cannot easily
be remedied by antidiscrimination laws, such as subconsciously expressed biases. See,
e.g., Duncan, supra note 251, at 510-29 (discussing compensatory justice, distributive
justice, and social utility rationales for affirmative action); see also TRIBE, supra note 26,
at 1521-44; Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car
Negotiations, 104 HARV. L. REv. 817 (1991); Schnapper, supra note 183.
However, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is one attempt by Congress to get
at biases and discrimination without the specific proof of discriminatory intent required
elsewhere. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(2) (Supp. 1997); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424, 429-31 (1971).
259. Arguably, most legislative accommodations do not operate by religious
classifications but by neutral functional criteria that happen to favor particular religions.
However, one cannot get around the fact that such accommodations were originally
intended to benefit particular religious groups or religion in general. In fact, the
conscientious-objector exemption started out as an exemption that applied only to an
enumerated set of Christian sects. See The Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 374-
75 (1918). To that extent, neutral actions taken with a discriminatory motive are equally
suspect as explicit racial classifications.
260. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
261. 497 U.S. 547 (1990), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S.
200 (1995).
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v. Pena,262 potentially casting doubt over the permissibility of diversity programs.
However, in repudiating Metro Broadcasting's intermediate-scrutiny standard of
review for benign racial classifications, which was relied on to uphold the FCC's
broadcasting diversity program in that case, Adarand did not reach the question
of the constitutionality of diversity programs themselves.263 In fact, the case law
strongly suggests that the diversity rationale for affirmative action programs will
survive strict scrutiny analysis."'
In particular, as a rationale for university admissions, the Court in Bakke
indicated that diversity affirmative action programs pass strict scrutiny review.265
Furthermore, more recent cases, such as Adarand, indicate the Court's inclination
to continue to find diversity affirmative action programs at the university level
constitutionally permissible.2 66 The justification can be found in the underlying
premise and goal of diversity. Because diversity affirmative action is based on the
understanding that student body diversity contributes to the diversity of
viewpoints and perspectives, such a program can also promote the "robust
exchange [and testing] of ideas," one of the core missions of institutions of higher
learning. 267 Because differences in race and ethnicity embody differences in an
individual's cultural identity, racial and ethnic differences can and do contribute
to the exchange of differing ideas and perspectives. In that respect, racial and
ethnic distinctiveness represents relevant differences that ought to be taken into
account in such programs.26
While diversity programs may promote individual cultural identity by
emphasizing the positive aspects of cultural distinctiveness, diversity programs
262. 515 U.S. at 227.
263. See id. at 235.
264. "[W]e wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory, but fatal in
fact."' Id. at 237 (quoting Fullilove v.Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J.,
concurring)).
265. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315-18.
266. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 219 (pointing out that strict scrutiny was actually
applied by Justice Powell in Bakke); see also id. at 257 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
According to Justice Stevens,
[Nothwithstanding the labels given the standard of review,] the FCC program
we upheld in [Metro Broadcasting] would have satisfied any of our various
standards in affirmative-action cases-including the one the majority
fashions today.... The proposition that fostering diversity may provide a
sufficient interest to justify such a program is not inconsistent with the
Court's holding today.
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original); see Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ.,
476 U.S. 267, 286 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) ("[S]tate interest in the promotion of racial diversity has been found
sufficiently 'compelling,' at least in the context of higher education, to support the use
of racial considerations .. "); Winter Park Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 873 F.2d 347,
353-54 (D.C. Cir. 1989), aff'd sub nom. Metro Broad., 497 U.S. 547, overruled by
Adarand, 515 U.S. 200; Davis v. Halpern, 768 F. Supp. 968 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
267. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313. Similarly, religious diversity can further similar purposes.
See Hall, supra note 66.
268. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 228 ("[S]trict scrutiny does take 'relevant differences'
into account-indeed, that is its fundamental purpose.") (emphasis in original).
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have also been criticized as perpetuating stereotypical views of racial minority
group members.269 Unfortunately, this criticism misunderstands the nature of
cultural identity, racial and religious. Designations of race and religion are just
as much a shorthand way of referring to an individual's outwardly apparent racial,
ethnic, and religious characteristics, including shared beliefs, experiences, and
attributes, as they are a statement about belonging.27 That different sense of
belonging, together with the attendant beliefs, values, and sense of identity, can
and frequently does provide minority group members with a perspective and
outlook different from the majority.27' What the stereotyping criticism of
affirmative action misunderstands is that the resulting outlook need not be
uniform.272 Just as members of the same religious group may differ in important
and specific aspects about their religious beliefs, the same can be and is often true
of the views of members of the same racial or ethnic group.2 3 Group members
may share commonalities that color their outlooks and views, yet other aspects
of an individual's life experiences shape his or her views as well. Based on those
unique experiences and backgrounds, such as social class, each person may
interpret and see shared characteristics in a different way.
Of course, diversity programs cannot guarantee the representation of particular
points of view because such a point of view may not necessarily coincide with a
269. Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 636 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (stating that the diversity
rationale is supposedly based "on the demeaning notion that members of the defined
racial groups ascribe to certain 'minority views' that must be different from those of other
citizens"); see also id. at 618-19 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that diversity
"impermissibly equat[es] race with thoughts and behavior").
Concerns of this kind of stereotyping are closely related to the debates about racial
essentialism in legal academia, a criticism about "a 'univocal,' monolithic theory ... in
which one reductionist voice claims to speak for all similarly situated." Johnson, supra
note 63, at 2033; see also Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102
HARV. L. REv. 1745 (1989) (challenging notion that specific ways of thinking or views
are associated with race or ethnicity).
270. See supra Part I.B. In fact, Will Kymlicka distinguishes this conception of
individuals from that of communitarians, in that cultural group members are able to
"stand back and assess moral values and traditional ways of life," whereas the
communitarian perspective denies that dissociation of constitutive aspects of the self is
possible. KYMLICKA, supra note 38, at 92.
271. See Aleinikoff, supra note 89, at 1093-95 (discussing essentialism as a criticism
of affirmative action diversity programs).
272. See Johnson, supra note 63. For instance, during World War II, young individual
Japanese Americans responded, based on their own reasons, in vastly different ways to
the indignity of internment, some choosing to remain in internment and others enlisting
in the United States military to prove their loyalty to the United States. Likewise,
Catholics may have widely varying views about abortion or ordination of women, even
though the official stance of the Catholic church is to oppose both.
273. See, e.g., Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 358-59 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring in the judgment) ("Common experience teaches that among 'religious'
individuals some are weak and others strong adherents to tenets .... ."); Johnson, supra
note 63, at 2012-20.
Even within a particular racial group, for example, belonging can differ. On the specific
issue of skin color in the African American community, see KATHY RUSSELL ET AL., THE
COLOR COMPLEX (1992).
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particular racial or ethnic group. Nevertheless, representation of such views is
more likely to occur in a setting with a diversity of cultural backgrounds than
where all people belong to the same cultural group. Insofar as consideration of
cultural background is only one factor among other predictive factors or
qualifications that are considered in such diversity affirmative action programs,
its use can be appropriately weighted in light of its significance or contribution
to the institution. 274
This difficulty with the diversity justification for affirmative action also points
to another reason why diversity is important as a tool for achieving racial and
ethnic equality. Diversity programs do not only foster diversity of views, they
also promote racial integration.275 It is the goal of integration that distinguishes
the benefits of diversity from the potential benefits of cultural uniformity and
exclusivity, and it is this significance of diversity that has been recognized as an
important public value.276
274. The Court's requirement that race not be the sole factor by which government
benefits or burdens are distributed is a simple recognition that government programs and
institutions serve a multitude of purposes, one of which may be racial integration. In the
education context, diversity programs can contribute to the overall educational mission
of the institution. In the employment context, different racial group membership can help
a company by providing the multicultural knowledge and skills as well as a multiracial
image that can provide greater appeal and marketability in a multiracial American
marketplace and a multiracial global economy. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct.
2157, 2164 (1997) ("There must be a congruence and proportionality between the injury
to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.").
Even in government contracting, racial diversity can serve an important integrating
function. Even though competition for government contracts usually is focused on
obtaining the best service or product for the lowest price, that is rarely ever the only goal.
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 644(a) (1994). Small businesses must be awarded government
contracts if it is determined that it is in the (1) "interest of maintaining or mobilizing the
Nation's full productive capacity," (2) "interest of war or national defense programs," (3)
"interest of assuring that a fair proportion of the total purchases and contracts for property
and services for the Government in each industry category are placed with small-business
concerns," or (4) "interest of assuring that a fair proportion of the total sales of
Government property be made to small-business concerns." Id.
275. See Karst, supra note 33, at 341-46; Sullivan, supra note 183, at 96; cf Regents
of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 374, 377 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in
judgment in part and dissenting in part) (stating that the purpose of the school's
affirmative action program "is to overcome the effects of segregation by bringing the
races together"). This purpose differs significantly from Justice Powell's conception of
diversity. See id. at 315 (arguing that the sole focus on ethnic diversity can hinder rather
than further true diversity).
276. See Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 601-02 (1990) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (arguing that the public value of "an integrated police force ... is ...
unquestionably legitimate"), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S.
200 (1995); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 691 (1984) ("Celebration of public
holidays, [such as Christmas,] which have cultural significance even if they have religious
aspects, is a legitimate secular purpose."); infra Part II.D.3; see also Christopher L.
Eisgruber, The Constitutional Value of Assimilation, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 87 (1996); cf
Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994)
(prohibiting religious segregation); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473
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Even though cultural group membership has important and positive identity-
affirming functions for an individual, a significant negative by-product of such
cultural "pride" is exclusion of those who are designated as outsiders."' Diversity
programs can directly counteract that negative by-product by integrating members
of differing cultural groups and by making familiar what is unknown and strange.
By showing that regardless of cultural background each individual shares more
in common with others than apart,278 and through emphasis on the benefits that the
differences of other cultural groups can contribute, diversity programs can
ameliorate the sense that a differing cultural identity is a liability. It encourages
people to look beyond those differences to the individual worth of a person. 9 In
creating opportunities for and encouraging contact and learning about persons of
U.S. 452, 472-73 n.24 (1985) (holding that although mental retardation is not a quasi-
suspect classification, ordinance expressing an irrational prejudice against the mentally
retarded and the absence of any rational basis in record for believing that group home
would pose any special threat to city's legitimate interests did not pass rational-basis
scrutiny).
277. In that respect, other attributes of membership in a different cultural group, such
as economic class background, would also be relevant. See Sheila Foster, Difference and
Equality: A Critical Assessment of the Concept of "Diversity", 1993 Wis. L. REV. 105.
Martha Minow has described the positive as well as negative aspects of such
differences as the "dilemma of differences." MINOW, supra note 169, at 19-49; see also
Karst, supra note 33, at 311-25 (discussing exclusion as a means of status enhancement
for group members).
278. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 315-16 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
It is one thing for a white child to be taught by a white teacher that color, like
beauty is only 'skin deep'; it is far more convincing to experience that truth
on a day-to-day basis during the routine, ongoing learning process.... [T]he
fact that persons of different races do, indeed, have differently colored skin,
may give rise to a belief that there is some significant difference between
such persons. The inclusion of minority teachers in the educational process
inevitably tends to dispel that illusion whereas their exclusion could only
tend to foster it.
Id. at 316 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see e.g., Aleinikoff, supra note 89, at 1081-88
(discussing the benefits of taking the perspective of racial minority groups to better
understand the relationship between the dominant and the dominated group); Duncan,
supra note 251.
279. In this regard, even affirmative action in government contracting serves an
integrative purpose. In Adarand, the affirmative action program provided financial
incentives for contractors to subcontract to minority businesses. See Adarand, 515 U.S.
at 205-09. By encouraging government contractors to work with minority subcontractors
and thus giving them a chance to show that their performance is equal to that of
nonminority subcontractors, such programs can help overcome discrimination. Cf id. at
261 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the "program seeks to overcome barriers of
prejudice between private parties-specifically, between general contractors and
subcontractors"). However, such programs ought to be potentially limited by the amount
of contracts that can be set aside in this fashion. In Adarand, it is unclear whether the
10% contract-bid advantage for minority businesses disadvantaged nonminority
businesses too much.
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different cultural backgrounds, the outsider is made to belong, and discrimination
reduced.
280
Diversity affirmative action programs, as a form of integration, are thus a far
more effective means of overcoming latent racial prejudice than abstract teaching
about the evils of prejudice.281' As long as such a program does not make race a
dispositive criterion for program eligibility and only imposes incidental burdens
212on nonbeneficiaries, it is a narrowly tailored means to achieve an important
governmental goal-reducing latent racial prejudice and the discrimination that
cannot be remedied by existing antidiscrimination laws.2 3 Diversity programs are
thus a means of redressing discrimination, just like existing antidiscrimination
laws,284 though they counteract discrimination at a different level.285
280. See Karst, supra note 42, at 336-37. As a result, such programs do not contribute
to the hardening of divisions along racial lines as extensive race-based quotas might.
The reality of inherent cultural and racial biases in every person and the salutary effects
of racial diversity have already been recognized in the jury venire cases, where the
Supreme Court has prohibited the use of peremptory challenges to strike members of
racial minorities from the jury. See Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 480-81 (1990);
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); see also Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 583.
Of course, companies, organizations, and educational institutions may institute
programs that seek diversity of employees based on factors entirely unrelated to race or
cultural group membership, such as skills or area of expertise. Although these programs
are not diversity affirmative action programs of the type discussed here, there is still no
reason why they should not be subject to generally applicable antidiscrimination
jurisprudence.
281. Cf infra text accompanying note 286 (observing that the Supreme Court has noted
that abstract, generalized prejudice is too "'amorphous a basis for imposing a racially
classified remedy"') (quoting Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276).
282. See supra notes 235-56.
283. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 228 ("By requiring strict scrutiny of racial
classifications, we require courts to make sure that a governmental classification based
on race, which 'so seldom provide[s] a relevant basis for disparate treatment,' is
legitimate, before permitting unequal treatment based on race to proceed.") (alteration in
original) (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 545 (1980) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)). Such diversity affirmative action programs will hasten the day that "race will
become a truly irrelevant, or at least insignificant, factor" for being an equal member of
society. Id. at 229.
There may, of course, be additional factors that need to be considered on a case-by-case
basis. For a discussion of such issues, see Days, supra note 212, at 485.
284. See Lawrence, supra note 59 (advocating extending antidiscrimination laws to
remedy subconscious racism). Integration is a different means of accomplishing the same
goal.
285. In this respect, the case for congressional action is especially strong because
Congress's Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers "may at times also include the
power to define situations which Congress determines threaten principles of equality and
to adopt prophylactic rules to deal with those situations." City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 490 (1989) (O'Connor, J., holding unclear) (emphasis in
original); see also Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966) ("Correctly viewed,
§ 5 is a positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion
in determining whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the
Fourteenth Amendment."). The scope of Congress's power to act under § 5 was not
resolved in Adarand. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 231.
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Of course, the Supreme Court has noted that general "[s]ocietal discrimination,
without more, is too amorphous a basis for imposing a racially classified
remedy," '286 and has required "particularized findings" of past discrimination to
justify affirmative action." 7 If affirmative action is viewed only as a remedy for
tort-like injuries, such as past discrimination, such a requirement may be
appropriate. However, such a narrow use of affirmative action is not appropriate
if affirmative action is a means toward achieving a broader societal goal, like
reducing latent discrimination.288
Affirmative action and legislative accommodations may thus be very similar in
how they affect beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries; however, arguably their
underlying purposes differ. By providing exemptions from generally applicable
rules of law or regulations, legislative accommodations permit individuals to
express their cultural identity freely. They eliminate the pressure to conform to
those who are already part of the community and, in that sense, permit individuals
to be different. In contrast, diversity affirmative action attempts to overcome
differences and integrates outsiders into the community. Affirmative action thus
focuses on making an individual with a differing cultural identity part of the
community in the first place.
However, even in this respect, an underlying similarity can be discerned. By
facilitating the expression of individual differences that are part of a person's
cultural identity (and thus that are fundamentally intertwined with a person's
conception of the self), the government validates and affirms the importance and
value of that individual's sense of self as equal to that of the majority members'.
The result is similar to that in affirmative action-individuals who are different
are included in the community as equals.289
286. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986); see also Croson, 488
U.S. at 499 (holding that an "amorphous claim that there has been past discrimination in
a particular industry cannot justify the use of an unyielding racial quota").
287. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276-77 (stating there must be "sufficient evidence to justify
the conclusion that there has been prior discrimination"); see Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC,
497 U.S. 547, 613-14 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting), overruled by Adarand, 515 U.S.
200.
288. Particularized findings of past discrimination can also be viewed as satisfying the
Court's need to state unequivocally that in some circumstances racial minorities continue
to face particularized discrimination in the present so as to justify and legitimate drastic
and specific race-based remedies. See Days, supra note 212, at 457-58; Sullivan, supra
note 183, at 91-92. In that sense, proven past discrimination simply serves as a proxy for
and evidence of present discrimination, as well as a means of verifying the existence of
present effects of past discriminatory actions. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 490-92.
Affirmative action programs are the means to the end of discrimination that would
otherwise continue to exist due to the recalcitrance of those who have engaged previously
in discrimination. See Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478
U.S. 421, 448-49 (1986). Requiring proof of specific discrimination when such programs
are directed at discrimination that is inherently difficult or impossible to prove would be
incongruous.
289. It is also in this respect that voting rights cases involving redistricting to improve
the electoral strength of minorities are different in a significant character from the
religious segregation question recently decided in Board of Education of Kiryas Joel
Village School District v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994). Even though redistricting in
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A more detailed exposition of this aspect of religion jurisprudence can be found
in the Court's endorsement jurisprudence.
3. Religious Inclusion and Exclusion: Legislative
Accommodations and Endorsement Jurisprudence
While religion jurisprudence has proven useful in analyzing race jurisprudence,
race jurisprudence can also be helpful in analyzing religion jurisprudence. In
particular, the integration purpose of affirmative action suggests that government
actions seeking to overcome differences and exclusion of religious outsider
groups may be constitutionally permissible as well.
Endorsement jurisprudence evinces the constitutional importance of inclusion
and tests the permissibility of government programs and actions in this regard.
The permissibility of such government programs hinges on the fact that even
though such programs provide special benefits only to select religious groups,
they do not send a message of exclusion to those who are not benefited.29 The
constitutional importance of the value of inclusion is revealed in Justice
O'Connor's opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly.29 There, the Court found a nativity
scene in a city's Christmas display not to be a violation of the Establishment
Clause because "[c]elebration of public holidays, which have cultural significance
even if they also have religious aspects, is a legitimate secular purpose." '292
Yet, the fact that Christmas has significance at all is because of its history as
a purely religious holiday. It is only by virtue of its widespread observance that
it became part of popular culture and thereby gained an additional cultural
significance independent of its religious character. Its acceptance into popular
culture by even those who are not Christian correspondingly reduces the message
of exclusion that official observance of that religious holiday may cause,293 a
message that O'Connor has characterized as endorsement of a particular
many instances takes race into account and aggregates members of a particular racial
group in particular voting districts, such redistricting is remedial in nature and conducted
with the ultimate goal of integration and increased participation of racial minorities in our
society. In contrast, the creation of political boundaries in Kiryas Joel was conducted not
with that purpose, but rather with the opposite and specific purpose of permitting the
Satmars to segregate and isolate themselves from the larger society.
290. Arguably, such government actions or programs sometimes do not actually provide
the favored religious group with concrete financial benefits, see, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly,
465 U.S. 668 (1984), unlike affirmative action programs that set aside public resources
for the benefit of minority groups. But just as governmental endorsement of the
superiority of one race provides an impermissible status benefit, with attendant beneficial
economic consequences, to the favored racial group regardless of the expenditure of
public funds, the same is true of symbolic governmental support for one religion. See id.
at 701 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
291. 465 U.S. at 687-94 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
292. Id. at 691 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
293. Of course, whether in fact official observance of Christmas is sufficiently
nonexclusionary in character to be constitutionally permissible is subject to disagreement.
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religion.'" Endorsement is impermissible because it "sends a message to
nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community,
and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored
members of the political community. 295 Conversely, a "relentless and all-
pervasive attempt to exclude religion from every aspect of public life could itself
become inconsistent with the Constitution. 296
But O'Connor's observation also suggests that government action intended to
send a message of inclusion is permissible under the Establishment Clause if it
is not attended by a message of exclusion to others. As a form of religious
accommodation by government to a majority of its citizens, official observance
of Christmas as a public holiday acknowledges the significance of that religious
holiday to Christians and validates the importance and belonging of such
individuals to the community. In a society such as ours that is largely secular,
such action can send an important message of inclusion to the religiously devout
who may feel alienated by the secular nature of government.
The Court's holding in Allegheny County v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLUP91 is
consistent with this perspective. There, Justice O'Connor found the display on
public property during Chanukkah season of a Jewish menorah, even though
clearly a religious symbol, to be a permissible form of government action because
it promoted inclusion of a minority religion.
By accompanying its display of a Christmas tree-a secular symbol of the
Christmas holiday season-with a salute to liberty, and by adding a religious
symbol from a Jewish holiday also celebrated at roughly the same time of
year, I conclude that the city did not endorse Judaism or religion in general,
but rather conveyed a message of pluralism and freedom of belief during the
holiday season.29
Endorsement jurisprudence thus reveals the Supreme Court's concerns with the
sense of belonging of religious minority or religious outsiders and the message
that government actions send.299
294. Thus, "whether a government activity communicates endorsement of religion..
is, like the question whether racial or sex-based classifications communicate an
invidious message, in large part a legal question to be answered on the basis of judicial
interpretation of social facts." Lynch, 465 U.S. at 693-94 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
295. Id. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
296. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 598 (1992). Thus, strict separation of religion and
government, such as requiring government only to acknowledge the secular "would
border on latent hostility toward religion ... to the exclusion and so to the detriment of
the religious." Allegheny County v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 657 (1989)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). A "wall of
separation" approach is unnecessarily restrictive of permissible governmental actions, see
id., because it would send a message of disapproval of the religious, see Lynch, 465 U.S.
at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring), in contrast to the irreligious.
297. 492 U.S. 573.
298. Id. at 635 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
299. Interestingly, Justice O'Connor's endorsement jurisprudence specifically analyzes
the message government support of religion provides to nonmembers of the favored group
in coming to a determination whether such government support is permissible, see id. at
632-37 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment), while such
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Of course, the extent to which government may go in seeking to include
particular religious groups is strictly limited by the potentially accompanying
exclusionary message to nonadherents. In Allegheny County, the official creche
display sent an exclusionary message to non-Christians and thus was
impermissible even though it posed "'no realistic risk' of 'represent[ing] an effort
to proselytize." 3 0
Such exclusionary concerns lie at the heart of the endorsement inquiry. At one
end of the spectrum, government action can be substantively neutral with respect
to religion because it promotes interests that are shared by religionists and
irreligionists alike. Exhibitions of religiously inspired paintings in a federally
funded art exhibition,3"' or funding of educational institutions that teach and study
religions as an academic endeavor fall within such permissible government
involvement. However, as soon as one moves away from that end of the spectrum,
the permissibility of governmental action becomes much less clear.0 2
considerations are deemed irrelevant in the race context, see Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC,
497 U.S. 547, 613 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting), overruled by Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
300. Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 602 (alteration in original) (quoting id. at 664
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)). But see Epstein,
supra note 84, at 2160-64 (arguing that official reference to religion as a means of
acknowledging religious beliefs of citizens because of traditional practices is
inappropriate).
Of course, an endorsement problem cannot be solved by simply providing equivalent
government support for other religious groups-after all, the Establishment Clause
protects adherents of irreligion as well. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52-53 (1985);
see also Frederick Mark Gedicks, Motivation, Rationality, and Secular Purpose in
Establishment Clause Review, 1985, ARIZ. ST. L.J. 677, 723-26.
301. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 683.
302. See id. at 668 (upholding the constitutionality of displaying a nativity scene in a
city park); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983) (holding that unecumenical
prayer by Christian minister before each state legislative session did not violate the
Establishment Clause). While Marsh was analyzed as a long-standing historical practice,
without regard to its endorsement implications, the same concerns apply.
A more current instance involves the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993
("RFRA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to bb-4 (1994) (held unconstitutional by City of Boerne
v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997)). In Boerne, the Supreme Court found the RFRA to be
an unconstitutional exercise of Congress's powers under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment and an impermissible attempt to change the Supreme Court's interpretation
of the Free Exercise Clause in Smith. Accordingly, Congress could not require states
under that power to accommodate religious free exercise. However, Boerne did not pass
on the ability of governments to accommodate religious free exercise voluntarily.
But even when applied only to federal government action, the RFRA, as a
"superlegislative accommodation," might still present constitutional problems. Because
the RFRA appears to elevate religious burdens over all other interests, it could be seen
to send a message of endorsement of religion in general. An additional significant
problem may be that the RFRA does not take into account the substantial burdens that
government actions in compliance with the RFRA might impose on others. See Boerne,
117 S. Ct. at 2172 (Stevens, J., concurring). In contrast, more specific programs
accommodating religion, such as aid to handicapped children in religious schools, see
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 14 (1993) (holding that the
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Legislative accommodations, for instance, fall into that gray area. Government
programs, such as the released-time program in Zorach v. Clauson,"3 the
conscientious-objector provision to the draft," 4 and the religious discrimination
exemption of Title VII," 5 all attempt to include as equals the followers of the
benefited faith. Because government has found certain religious differences from
government-sanctioned norms to be sufficiently important in those instances to
justify an exemption from the norms, accommodations recognize the legitimacy
of such differences and thus the legitimacy of that individual's conception of the
self. The effect is one of inclusion.
The opposite was true for the legislative "accommodation" at issue in Board of
Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet."6 There, the
"accommodation" in fact sought to segregate a religious community from the
larger society rather than facilitate its inclusion. In that respect, the
"accommodation" was antithetical to what is intended to be achieved by religious
accommodations, inclusion as an equal, and was accordingly constitutionally
impermissible."'
Consideration of race jurisprudence suggests also that an additional relevant
consideration in the endorsement inquiry is the existence of past discrimination
against the particular religious group."' Religious displays of faiths which have
clearly been the subject of past and present discrimination by a particular
community would be less likely to raise endorsement problems than religious
displays of sects that cannot point to such a background. Displays of persecuted
religions could thus be seen as a form of "remedial" measure for religious
outsiders, and as a means of emphasizing their inclusion. Again, the Court's
holding in Allegheny County is consistent with this view. The display of the
Jewish menorah did not present establishment concerns because it was
representative of a religion that has been the subject of significant discrimination
in the past. In contrast, the display of a crdche, representative of the Christian
majority religion that cannot point to such a history in this country, did raise
establishment problems.30 9
Establishment Clause does not prohibit a school district from providing a sign language
interpreter for a deaf student attending a parochial school), or federal funding for core
educational subjects in religious schools, see Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997),
appears not to cross that line.
303. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
304. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965); The Selective Draft Law Cases,
245 U.S. 366 (1918).
305. See Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
306. 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
307. Of course, that kind of restriction does not appear to exist in the context of
constitutionally mandated accommodations. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972). To the extent that the religious interest there is much stronger than those involved
in legislative accommodations, and to the extent the government does not willingly use
its power to exclude some from the larger community, that distinction may be justified.
308. Of course, irreligionists would qualify as well.
309. Just as in the race context, this inquiry does not provide a ready solution for
discrimination in the government's decision of which specific religious faith to select for
permitted governmental acknowledgment or special governmental benefits. See Kiryas
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But regardless of how legal doctrines regarding religion are expressed, such as
by prohibiting the exclusion of religious outsiders, the permissibility of
government actions is, in the end, always judged by its effect on the individual
and his or her conception of the self.
CONCLUSION
Individualism and individual liberty are values that our Constitution holds dear.
But a diversity of individual interests also means that people will separate and
aggregate into smaller groups supportive of their interests, goals, and identity.
And it is such aggregation and differentiation that can give rise to prejudice and
racial bigotry.
Public actions toward racial and religious minorities can be regulated to a large
extent-true racial and religious tolerance cannot. In the long run, the only
effective bulwark against such discrimination is the changing of public attitudes
and discourse over the legitimacy of, and protection afforded to, cultural minority
group members.
Even though education, social integration, and supportive measures by
government can speed up the changing of such attitudes and beliefs, elimination
of prejudice and bigotry cannot occur without acceptance of cultural minorities
as equals, and even then, not until cultural minorities are permitted to participate
fully in the larger society on their own terms.10 Yet, that can only be achieved if
integral aspects of their self-identity, cultural heritage, and sense of belonging are
not denigrated. Denial of difference, such as a color-blind jurisprudence, demeans
only members of the minority group because it is the minority's distinguishing
characteristics that are viewed as nonconforming. A minority group's desire to
preserve its racial and ethnic identity should not be any more radical, alienating,
or threatening to the majority than a group's desire to preserve its unique
religious beliefs.
In that respect, it is the willingness to accept that which is ridiculous or
distasteful to one as essential or holy to another, not just with respect to religious
beliefs but also with regard to racial and ethnic practices and aspects, that we
ought to strive for. In the end, it is tolerance and the strength of our shared values
and ideals, such as those embodied in the Constitution, that holds us together as
one nation-not the suppression of dissent and differences.3 '
Joel, 512 U.S. 687 (expressing concern about discrimination in conferral of government
benefit). Nevertheless, considering past and present discrimination can significantly
advance the inquiry.
310. See GORDON, supra note 6, at 235 ("Studies have pointed to the role of intimate
equal-status contact between members of majority and minority groups in reducing
prejudice.").
311. See generally Bill Ong Hing, Beyond the Rhetoric of Assimilation and Cultural
Pluralism: Addressing the Tension of Separatism and Conflict in an Immigration-Driven
Multiracial Society, 81 CAL. L. REV. 863 (1993) (stating that the core values of our nation
are respect for the laws, liberty, equality, and republicanism); Karst, supra note 33, at
363.
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The task that I have sought to accomplish here is not to provide ready-made
solutions to problems that our nation has struggled with for a long time. Rather,
it is to bring a different analytical perspective to race and religion issues, which
emphasizes the importance and role of individual identity and dignity
considerations in these problems. Recognizing the similarities of race and religion
and extending the protections afforded in the religion context to the race context
can be an important step toward the elusive goal of equality.

